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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE OF TEESIS
The Department of Defense has adopted the Voluntary
Separation Incentive (VSI) and Special Separation Benefit
(SSB) programs, authorized by the 1992 National Defense
Authorization act, as one of the most visible policy tools in
its current strategy to downsize the military. The program
has been fairly successful in aiding the Navy's efforts to
meet end-strength requirements and to properly "shape" the
force, particularly at the mid-career level. In 1992, for
example, 3,876 Navy enlisted personnel elected to accept the
VSI or SSB, with 3,408 "takers," to date, in 1993 (Ref. 1]
This thesis, unlike others that have been completed on
this subject, will not attempt to determine why an individual
decided to accept the VSI/SSB offer or why more service
members opted for lump-sum payments (SSB) over yearly annuity
checks (VSI). Rather, it will attempt to determine the effect
of ratings type and the timing of program offerings on
individual decisions to take the VSI or SSB. The results of
this study should be of benefit to Navy manpower and budget
planners as the drawdown continues. The results should also
provide additional insight into the efficiency and
1
effectiveness of the programs and possibly aid in "fine-
tuning" voluntary separation benefits in the future.
B. BACKGROUND: WRY I8 VSI/BB NZZDZD?
In 1989, the armed services began reducing military
personnel end strength. Contributing factors to these force
reductions included the fall of the Soviet Union and the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The end of the Cold War
radically altered the basis of the defense policy of the
United States and, as a result of these events, Congress
determined that the size of the armed forces exceeded the
nation's needs. The military was planning its reductions and
developing policies based on estimates that projected the
enlisted Navy end strength at 494,923 for fiscal 1991, with
current estimates further reducing it to 439,373 by the end of
fiscal 1993 [Ref. 1]. The budget problems facing the newly-
elected administration, highlighted by larger-than-expected
deficit figures, provided sufficient pressure to cut military
spending more than planned and forced the projected end
strength figures even lower than anticipated. This is
reflected in the fiscal 93 Presidential Budget, which
proposed, for the Navy, a fiscal 1994 enlisted end strength of
413,825, approximately 20,500 fewer than in previous
projections (Ref. 1].
There is no precedent for these drastic reductions in the
all-volunteer period. All previous large-scale force
2
reductions occurred following the conclusion of a war in which
conscription was used to "grow the force." Since the majority
of the personnel in the armed forces during these periods were
draftees or draft-induced enlistees had not chosen the
military as their primary career, equitable treatment of
volunteers was not a major consideration. Consequently, force
reductions in these cases were accomplished simply by lowering
the number of draftees and by allowing those drafted to return
home.
These methods of reducing end strength cannot be used by
responsible policy makers in the era of the all-volunteer
force (AVF). In today's AVF, individuals voluntarily enter
the service by enlisting. Relatively high numbers of these
enlistees re-enlist, stay in the military, and plan on
retiring at the completion of at least 20 years of service.
Also, during the most of the volunteer era, manpower policies
focused on enlisting and retaining high-quality personnel. To
maintain a high-quality force, policies were aimed at
providing higher levels of compensation as well as substantial
reenlistment bonuses to keep quality personnel. These
policies have been successful. Today's military is the most
senior of any in the last 50 years. Ironically, it is the
successes of manpower planners in developing these policies,
coupled with their increased understanding of the effects of
previous force reduction methods on force-shaping and
:3
effectiveness, that complicate force drawdowns in the all-
volunteer era.
To reach .he end strength goals of a smaller armed forces,
military manpower planners are turning their attention toward
developing a set of compensation policies particularly suited
for the all-volunteer force. These policies must satisfy
stated Congressional preferences for reducing the force
through voluntary separations, in an equitable and fiscally
prudent-manner, and take into account the career expectations
of volunteers.
It is obvious that these constraints effectively negate
the use of the draft-era force reduction methods. Aside from
the fact that previous downsizing techniques did not equitably
consider career expectations, manpower analysts have concluded
that the force reduction methods used in past do more harm
than good, both in the short and long term. End strength
reductions that cut accessions and/or release junior personnel
disproportionately cause large increases in seniority in the
short-term and make cyclical changes in the experience
distribution of the force more likely in the future (Ref. 2:p.
8]. The increase in near-term seniority provides the services
with a capable, but expensive force. The cyclical experience
distribution, on the other hand, may require senior personnel
to perform jobs below their ability level. As these senior
personnel retire, the Junior personnel are required to fill
positions that they may not have sufficient experience to
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perform effectively. This may lead to a decrease in military
effectiveness. The uneven experience distribution can also
cause a lag in promotion opportunities for junior personnel.
One ef f ect of decreased promotion opportunities is the loss of
higher quality junior personnel, who tend to be more sensitive
to promotion opportunities.
Involuntary separations can clearly ýand easily) meet any
numerical end strength goals. The major drawbacks to large-
scale involuntary separations include: 1) devastating effects
on the morale of remaining members; 2) adverse consequences
for future recruiting; and 3) negative public perceptions,
especially if senior personnel are adversely affected. In
addition, they would be contrary to the wishes of Congress to
concentrate on voluntary separations [Ref. 2:p. vii]. These
detrimental effects occur even though monetary separation
payments are provided for personnel involuntarily separated
under honorable conditions. These payments fall far short of
providing equitable compensation for the loss of pension
benefits for the majority of individuals and, if provided as
an incentive for voluntary separations, would not provide the
'military departments with an adequate number of separations.
Involuntary separations become even less of an option as
an individual's length of service increases above ten to
twelve years. This results from an implicit contract that
develops between the military and service members, over time,
as a result of the sudden vesting for retirement which occurs
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at twenty years of service. This contract protects mid-career
personnel from actions that would substantially affect their
expected future income. The implicit contract is not one-
sided, however, as it also benefits the military. It serves
as protection to the services against sudden, sizable
departures of career personnel during periods of growth or
stability. During periods of force reductions, though, this
implicit contract acts as an additional constraint for
military planners. It requires voluntary separation policies
to provide incentives that service memberi. perceive as being
sufficient to surrender expected retirement benefits (Ref.
2:p. 2].
To date, military manpower planners have developed several
policies to help facilitate the downsizing efforts required to
meet end strength requirements imposed upon the services.
These policies proviae the mechanisms for properly "shaping"
the force, thus avoiding problems caus,• ky cyclical changes
in the experience distribution. One reason these policies
prove to be effective is that each policy affects personnel at
different levels of experience and skill. The policies
provide different incentives for distinct categories of
service members in an attempt to overcome the diverse career
expectations of the force. By targeting personnel at
different levels of experience with different programs,
military policy planners have been successful in ensuring that
6
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force reductions result in proportional cuts across experience
levels.
The first downsizing policy is to reduce accessions. But,
reducing accessions goes only so long as future end strength
requirements are sustained. Reductions that are below the
level to sustain requirements only serve to exacerbate the
"hollow force" phenomenon caused by cyclical experience
distribution.
Another policy, the Enlisted Navy Career Objectives for
Reenlistment (ENCORE) program, though not technically a
voluntary separation incentive program, is an effective force-
shaping tool. Employed in conjunction with controlled
reenlistment rates, it concentrates exclusively on first-term
personnel. ENCORE redistributes junior personnel into
underpopulated ratings or occupations and separates those
unwilling to transition into other ratings. It has been
successful in filling historically undermanned ratings, thus
reducing "experience gaps." It also creates increased
promotion opportunities. The reduction in e::rerience gaps and
the resulting morale increase from additional advancement
opportunities should result in a higher quality force in the
future.
High Year Tenure (HYT) adjustments and Selective Early
Retirement (SER) boards have also been used to influence
retention behavior. They both are methods used to reduce the
number of mid- and upper-level officers and enlisted personnel
7
without affecting the retirement eligibility of these
personnel. Though they are involuntary programs, they only
apply to personnel who are already retirement-eligible and
have not met advancement or promotion requirements. SER
boards in the Navy have, to date, concentrated on retirement-
eligible Limited Duty Officers, Commanders and Captains who
have twice failed to be selected for the next highest pay
grade. HYT numbers, on the other hand, indicate the maximum
number of years that enlisted members of certain pay grades
may remain in the service prior to mandatory retirement. The
HYT limits have been adjusted as shown in Table 1.
TABLE I
HIGH YEAR TENURE (HYT) ADJUSTMENTS
BY PAYGRADE, FISCAL 1993-94
Fiscal HYT Years by Paygrade
Year i
E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7 E-8 E-9
1993 10 20 23 26 28 30
1994 10 20 20 24 26 30
Source: [Ref. 3]
These policies have worked very well thus far. Personnel
with six to 20 years of service, however, have not been
effectively targeted, though, which led to the development of
the VSI and SSB programs. This program policy, in keeping
with the intentions of Congress to minimize involuntary
separations, focuses on specific individuals, based on
8
ratings, Navy Enlisted Classifications (NEC), and various
years of service. The policy offers these individuals their
choice of a Variable Separation Incentive (VSI) or a Special
Separation Benefit (SSB). The years of service range, driven
by manning levels in specific occupations, varies across
ratings and allows the program to meet the specific needs of
the Navy. The specifics of the VSI and SSB programs are
discussed in the next section.
C. VSI/SSB PROGRAM STRUCTURE
The VSI and SSB programs became effective on January 1,
1992. Specific procedures for eligibility, VSI/SSB program
benefits and details, about program implementation are
described below.
1. ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
A service member is eligible to apply for the VSI or
SSB program if he or she meets the following criteria:
"* Has completed at least six years of active duty prior to
December 6, 1991, but less than 20 years of service;
"* Has completed at least five years of continuous active
service immediately prior to the effective date of
separation;
"* Is serving on active duty, or, if a Reservist, is on the
active duty list; and
"* Fulfills any other criteria, as established by the
individual services, such as years of service, skill or
rating, grade or rank and remaining period of obligated
service (Ref. 4:pp. 6-59,6-60].
Service members who do meet all of the eligibility
requirements may voluntarily request separation under the VSI
or SSB program. Not all eligible personnel who apply for the
program must be approved; applications may be rejected if
readiness becomes an issue. Service members who are approved
must separate from the military prior to September 30, 1995,
when Congressional authority for the program expires (Ref.
5:p. 2].
2. PAYMENTS, BENEFITS AND RESERVE OBLIGATIONS.
a. Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI)
The VSI provides a stream of annual payments equal
to 2.5 percent of the separating individual's final monthly
basic pay, multiplied by 12 and multiplied again by the number
of years of service. These annual payments will continue for
a period equal to twice the number of years of active duty
service. Acceptance of VSI requires a Ready Reserve
obligation for a period equal to the length of the annual
payments. All payments and benefits will be discontinued if
the service member is separated from the reserves, unless the
service member becomes ineligible to continue to serve in the
reserve due to medical, age or other limitations. In the
event of the service member's death, annual payments will
continue to designated beneficiaries for the remaining
entitlement length.
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b. Special Separation Benefit (SSB)
Member's approved for separation under the SSB will
receive a lump-sum payment equal to 15 percent of the
individual's final monthly basic pay, multiplied by 12 and
multiplied again by years of service. In addition to the
pecuniary benefits just mentioned, these individuals also
receive the same non-pecuniary benefits as members who are
involuntarily separated. Individuals receiving the SSB are
required to serve in the Ready Reserve for at least three
years. If the service member has obligated service remaining
at the time of separation from active duty, the three-year
obligation commences on the day after completion of the
obligation.
3. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
The fiscal 1992 program was offered in four separate
phases. As the year progressed, the VSI and SSB were offered
to an increasing number of Navy enlisted personnel by
expanding eligible ratings and years of service categories.
The vast majority of "takers" chose the lump sum payments of
the SSB instead of the VSI annuity. These results were
opposite of tho'se expected by the manpower planners. They had
anticipated that a much higher proportion of personnel would
choose the VSI annuittes, due, in part, to the higher net
present values and to the similarity to the 20-year retirement
plan. The difference in results from those expected caused a
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large increase in the up-front costs to the Navy due to the
higher initial SSB payments. It is felt that a possible
reason for the one-sided result is the difference in the non-
pecuniary benefits between the two separation incentives. To
help increase the number of personnel opting for the annual
annuities, the Department of Defense authorized the
equalization of non-pecuniary benefits between the two
separation incentives for fiscal 1993. These changes in the
benefits may not have achieved the desired results, as the
equalization of the benefits were not widely known by the
Fleet until the third of the three fiscal 1993 program phases.
But, even in phase 3, the number of personnel choosing SSB
over VSI shows the changes would not have produced the desired
results.
D. OBJECTIVES
This study has two primary objectives. The first
objective is to determine the characteristics of individuals
who do not accept VSI or SSB when initially offered, but
rather wait for a period of time until making the decision to
leave the service via this program. Secondly, this study
attempts to determine when individuals are more likely to take
the separation bonus. That is, are individuals more likely to
accept the bonus when first eligible or during a later phase?
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E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research questions to be answered are:
* When an individual is eligible to separate via the VSI or
SSB program for several phases, what are the determining
factors in the timing of the separation decision?
* How does prior eligibility for the VSI and SSB program
affect the take decision making process during later
eligibility phases?
F. SCOPE OF THESIS
This thesis uses both 1992 and 1993 data to analyze the
impact of the timing of the eligibility announcements and
attempts to determine why individuals accepted VSI/SSB when
they did. It attempts to accomplish this by looking at the
data longitudinally. This information may help to clarify
reasons why some individuals or groups of individuals are more
or less likely than others to use the VSI or SSB to separate
from the naval service. The results may also provide some
insight into the importance of ensuring the widest possible
dissemination of information concerning the drawdown to all
Naval personnel, whether eligible for the program or not.
This study should help manpower and budget planners as the
Navy continues its drawdown, with larger than expected
reductions possible in the near future. It should provide
additional insight into the efficiency and effectiveness of
the separation benefits and enable manpower planners to fine-
tune the program in the near future.
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0. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
It is intended for each chapter to build on the
information contained in the preceding chapters. The
information presented in Chapter II, for example, provides the
theoretical framework for the creation of the variables used
and the model specified in Chapter III. Following this,
Chapter IV offers an in-depth look at the data used in the
study. Results and analysis of the data previously described





The military is facing the unique challenge of developing
incentives for individuals to voluntarily leave the service.
A great deal of the literature on the All-Volunteer Force
investigates factors that affect the propensity of people to
join or remain in the military. An example of an analytical
model used in these studies is the annualized cost of leaving
(ACOL) model, developed by John T. Warner to study the
relative effectiveness of alternative retirement systems on
enlisted retention [Ref 6:p. 3].
There have been very few studies conducted to date that
specifically discuss the subject of voluntary separation
incentives used by the military. Consequently, this chapter
summarizes some literature that is available in related areas.
First, a short discussion of the ACOL model is presented,
along with an explanation of the theory of iccupational
choice. This is followed by summaries of studies in the
following areas: organizational decline in the private sector
and reenlistment and voluntary turnover in the military. The
literature review is concluded with a discussion of studies
most closely related to the use of voluntary separation
15
incentives--reports on military financial incentives and
benefits.
B. ANNUALIZED COST OF LEAVING (ACOL)
Many of the factors that go into the reenlistment
decision have been summarized in the ACOL model. This model,
developed by Warner to determine the effects of changes in the
military retirement system on reenlistment decisions, is
widely used today by manpower planners to predict retention
(Ref. 7:p. 24]. The model assumes that an individual's
decision to leave or remain in the military is based on the
perceived costs and benefits of continued military service
versus civilian alternatives. It compares the present value
of streams of future military and civilian incomes. In its
simplest form, the model is specified as
ACOL - M + B - C
where M is the discounted expected military stream of
payments, B is the effect of a bonus, and C is the discounted,
expected civilian payment stream [Ref. 8:p. 25]. The decision
to stay will be made when M, the military option, is perceived
to be greater than C, the civilian option. The bonus effect,
B, would be added to the military payment stream in the case
of a selected reenlistment bonus (SRB) and subtracted in the
event of VSI/SSB. In essence, VSI/SSB payments have the
effect of increasing the expected civilian payment stream,
while SRBs have the opposite effect and increase the expected
16
military stream. It is precisely these effects that point to
the probable relevance of past SRB studies to current studies
on the VSI/SSB program.
The perceived value of each income stream is determined by
personal discount rates. The perceived values of these
streams are identical at the "breakeven" point, also known as
the "breakeven" discount rate. Those with personal discount
rates exceeding the "breakeven" rate will accept the
separation bonus and leave the service, while those with
personal discount rates below the "breakeven" point will stay
[Ref. 9:p. 4).
Prior research has identified a variety of factors or
individual characteristics that determine personal discount
rates. These characteristics may assist in acting as
indicators of the likelihood of accepting the VSI/SSB bonus.
Many of these factors were summarized by Mehay and Kirby [Ref.
9]. Some of the factors that are associated with higher
personal discount rates (and thus the probability of accepting
the separation bonus) include lower education levels, lower
skill levels, fewer years of service, minority status, a lower
probability of promotion or of reaching retirement (as
measured the degree to which an occupation is over strength),
and, all else equal, better civilian opportunities. Better
civilian opportunities are typically measured by type of
occupation, skill transferability, and overall labor market
conditions. Factors lowering the personal discount rate
17
include an increased probability of reaching retirement, as
measured by higher year of service cells and pay grades [Ref.
9:p. 4-5].
The general economic theory behind the studies that follow
involve occupational choice. This theory looks at the
decision to leave or stay in the military as a choice between
alternative occupations, military or civilian. This choice is
felt to be a measure of utility, and, as such, includes a
"taste" or "distaste" for the military [Ref. 10:p. 258]. This
widely accepted theory parallels the thinking behind the
development of the ACOL model. Thus, the variables, proxies,
and modeling techniques used in these studies should be usable
in this thesis.
C. ORGANIZATIONAL DECLINE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
The majority of the research conducted in the area of
organizational decline in the private sector agrees that
organizations have a variety of strategies to choose from when
downsizing (Ref. 11:p. 20]. The strategies most commonly used
were compiled by The American Management Association in a 1992
survey and are listed in Table 4. As can be seen here,
private organizations are moving toward the use of voluntary
separation incentives and early retirements, as is also the
case with the military services.
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TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS SURVEYED THAT USED A PARTICULAR
STRATEGY TO REDUCE INVOLUNTARY LAYOFFS/SEPARATIONS,
JUNE 1989 AND JULY 1992
STRATEGY JULY 1989 JUNE 1992
_PERCENT USING jPERCENT USING
Hiring freeze 62.8 61.6
Demotions/transfer 44.1 44.2
Salary reduction/freeze 46.2 35.1
Early retirement incentive 19.3 34.3
Voluntary separation plan 19.5 28.6
Voluntary job sharing 11.0 15.8
Mandatory short work 24.1 15.3
week/day
Limited duration furlough N/A 13.8
Source: [Ref. 12:p. 3].
The selection of specific strategies used by downsizing
organizations is driven by a variety of factors. These
factors include the length of time available to achieve
downsizing goals, the organizational philosophy, legal
constraints, outside influences and the impact of downsizing
actions on both terminated and surviving employees (Ref. 13:p.
42). The more proactive an organization is in planning a
reduction-in-force, the more it can use strategies such as
voluntary separation incentives and the more successful it has
been in achieving its goals. If the downsizing process
includes honest estimates as to the future direction of the
organization, decreased costs and increased efficiency will
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result, in addition to the achievement of numerical goals
[Ref. 13:p. 21]. The proactive approach will also aid in
minimizing negative effects on the morale of the surviving
employees. In addition, it will increase the perception by
the public that, although downsizing is occurring, the
organization is doing all it can to "be fair." This
perception is vital in maintaining a positive image of the
organization for future employees [Ref. 13:p. 21].
D. REENLISTMENT STUDIES
Three studies, all of which were based on the theory of
occupational choice, were reviewed for this portion of the
thesis. Chow and Polich attempted to assess the determining
factors on first-term reenlistment decisions through use of a
survey given to 4,000 enlisted personnel from all three
military services [Ref. 14]. Hiller published a report in
1982 that discussed his findings concerning the reenlistment
behavior of career personnel (those with six to 10 years of
service). Like Chow and Polich, Hiller obtained his data from
a previously conducted survey, only this time of 2,500
enlisted and officer personnel [Ref. 15]. Finally, Adedeji
and Quester (1991) studied the impacts of changes in personnel
policies and personal characteristics on the reenlistment
decisions of enlisted Marines. Unlike the previous two
studies, they did not use survey results, but relied on data
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files from over 27,000 Marines who had made the first tern
reenlistment decision over a ten-year period [Ref. 16].
Though each of these studies looked at different groups of
military personnel, at different decision points in their
careers, and were conducted with different purposes in mind,
many similarities between the studies exist. Each of these
studies developed a variety of variables, similar yet
distinct, with the exact variable characteristics determined
by the data available to the researchers. These variables
were used to describe both the pecuniary and nonpecuniary
benefits of military service, and to estimate expected
civilian earnings.
Using logit models;' the researchers in each of these
studies were able to determine the statistical significance of
selected variables on the probability of a person's
reenlistment. Variables that proved to be statistically
significant in increasing the probability of reenlistment
include the level of military compensation, the fact that the
service member has dependents, lower education levels, being
female or non-white, 2 increased years of service, 3 and being
I"Logit" models are discussed in greater detail in the chapter
on methodology.
2These three variables partially describe groups that may have
relatively greater difficulty in obtaining civilian employment with
compensation equivalent to their current military employment.
3This variable is felt to capture both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary factors.
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in a higher pay grade. Each one of the significant
explanatory variables had signs consistent with the
researchers' expectations and were consistent w'th the
hypothesis based on occupational choice [Ref: 17:pp. 16-23].
3. VOLUNTARY TURNOVER STUDIES
The studies of voluntary turnover reviewed here were
concerned with determining the factors that best explain
"quit" behavior, or the reasons why individuals leave the
military. Information from studies on this topic were
especially useful during the early years of the All Volunteer
Force, since decreasing the voluntary separation of military
personnel (or increasing their retention rates) was considered
vital to the future of the all-volunteer system. Stolzenberg
and Winkler (1983) compiled a comprehensive review of military
voluntary separation studies conducted through 1981. In
general, the authors concluded that compensation influences
the "stay or leave" decision, but that nonpecuniary factors
may be even more important than pecuniary factors in
importance in their effects on attrition decisions. The
complexity of the military pay and benefits causes many
enlisted personnel to underestimate their true compensation,
which blurs the line between monetary and nonmonetary factors.
Regardless of the reasoning, it has been determined that
higher compensation levels do decrease voluntary separation
22
rates, compensation paid in lump-sum amounts were found to be
more attractive to military personnel than installment
payments and non-pecuniary benefits grow in importance as
retirement nears [Ref. 18].
Lakhani (1988) performed an analysis of U. S. Army data to
determine the effects of training received in the military on
an individual's quit behavior [Ref. 19]. He found that there
are differences in separation behavior between groups that
received different types of training. Persons receiving
military-specific (combat) training develop skills that are
less transferrable to the civilian sector than the skills of
those who are trained in more general areas. This should lead
to the conclusion that persons in combat occupations are more
likely to remain in the Army. However, Lakhani also
determined that combat occupational specialties (MOS) involve
higher nonpecuniary costs than other specialties. These
increased nonmonetary costs, in the form of more difficult
working conditions and increased danger, should increase
voluntary separation. Lakhani concluded that occupations must
be grouped into categories that are relatively homogeneous,
based on similar training, job requirements, working
conditions, and transferability to the civilian sector [Ref.
19:p. 433].
23
P. MILITARY FINANCIAL INCZNTIXVZ AND BDNIFITB
Considerations addressed in research on the SRB program
parallel those pertinent to the VSI/SSB program. The goals of
both programs include the coordination of national security
objectives with end-strength requirements. Both programs also
consider the effective shaping of the force to ensure the
proper mix of knowledge, skills and experience. This ability
to allocate funds specifically to desired ratings and years-of
-service groups supports the selection of VSI/SSB as a tool
for voluntary separation, and it is the parallels to the SRB
program that provide us with the majority of the theoretical
underpinnings for analysis of the VSI/SSB data.
The two reenlistment bonus studies reviewed here both
began with the theory of occupational choice and specified
variables to control for military pay, and they both used
personal demographic variables as proxies for civilian earning
opportunities. Hosek and Peterson conducted their research to
determine the effectiveness of reenlistment incentive
programs, specifically looking at the extent to which
retention rates were increased by the bonuses [Ref. 20].
Their study found that the effect of the bonus was positive
and significant in the reenlistment decision. Lump sum
bonuses were also found to be almost twice as effective at
increasing retention rates as installment bonuses. Bonuses
were seen to produce the same effects as higher unemployment
rates in increasing reenlistment rates. The effects of
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personal attributes were as expected: non-whites, women and
non-high school graduates were more likely to stay in the
service than whites, men and those with a high school
education. Bonuses were found to be especially effective in
the force-shaping role, as they allow for the selective
targeting of groups by occupation and years of service (Ref.
20:pp. 30-52].
Cymrot used historical data to measure the strength of the
relationship between bonuses and reenlistment rates in the
Marine Corps (Ref. 8:p. 24]. Using the ACOL model, he
included schooling, work experience, AFQT category, race, and
sex as explanatory variables. Overall, his study found that
the reenlistment bonus is effective at increasing the
reenlistment rates of enlisted Marines. There were
differences in the behavior of Marines in the same
occupations, but with different years of service. Those with
fewer years of service tended to be more likely to accept the
bonus, while Marines with 10+ years of service were more
influenced by the military retirement system (Ref. 8:pp. 39-
45].
0. CONCLUSIONS
Trends evident in civilian downsizing studies and the
desires and requirements of Congress concerning the current
military downsizing support the military's choice of voluntary
separation incentives as the correct method to use. Prior
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studies conducted that the factors that will determine the VSI
or SSB take decision should parallel those that have proved to
be statistically significant in affecting the stay or leave
and reenlistment bonus decisions, especially in response to
voluntary incentives. These factors have been analyzed
through the cost-of-leaving model (ACOL), the primary
retention prediction model used by researchers and are the
basis for the models specified later in this thesis.
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111. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. DESCRIPTION OF DATA
1. OVERVIEW
The original data used in this thesis consisted of a
combination of VSI and SSB files and versions of the Enlisted
Master File (EMF) controlled by the Defense Manpower Data
Center (DMDC).4 Three main files were employed in compiling
the information required for use in performing the statistical
analysis. For fiscal 1992, there was a single file containing
37,907 records of all Navy enlisted personnel eligible for
VSI/SSB during that fiscal year. This file also contained
information identifying the specific individuals who elected
to voluntarily separate from the Navy during fiscal 1992.
The 1993 data were initially contained in two separate
data sets. The first set was comprised of 2,992 records of
individuals accepting either the VSI or SSB program during
fiscal 1993, while the second set consisted of the 464,557
records of Navy enlisted personnel remaining in the September
1992 EMF (i.e., at the beginning of fiscal 1993).
4This information was merged and converted into the Statistical
Applications System (SAS) format by Ms. Melissa Potter. SAS is the
statistical package used for all analysis.
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2. DATA SEPARATION
Prior to merging and analyzing the records, it was
necessary to ensure that the files from both fiscal years were
in similar formats. The first step was to identify persons
eligible for VSI and SSB during fiscal 1993. The applicable
records from this file were identified by matching information
obtained from the Naval messages used to publicize program
eligibility requirements [Ref. 21]. The eligibility criteria
consisted of specific ratings, paygrades, and YOS windows,
with restrictions, based on Naval Enlisted Classifications
(NECs), applicable to many of the ratings. The merged fiscal
1993 data set, containing information on both the "takers" and
the "non-takers," consists of 25,465 personnel. The
eligibility criteria for both fiscal 1992 and fiscal 1993 are
presented in their entirety in Appendix A.
Once all personnel eligible to separate from the Navy
through the VSI and SSB program were identified for both
fiscal 1992 and fiscal 1993, it was necessary to code the
individual records for the phases in which they were eligible.
For both the fiscal 1992 and the combined fiscal 1993 takers
files, this was accomplished by determining the initial phase
in which individuals were eligible through the use of the
variable OFFERDATE, with some manipulation required to account
for eligibility in more than one phase. The variable ACTDATE
was used to mark the individual files for the phase in which
the VSI/SSB program was accepted, if applicable.
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The records in the fiscal 1993 eligible file were
marked for phase eligibility using the program criteria. The
eligibility criteria expanded as the fiscal year progressed;
more ratings were added, YOS windows were expanded to between
8 and 17 years of service for most ratings, and paygrades,
unlike fiscal 1992, included E-7 as well as E-5 and E-6 for
some ratings. Although the eligibility criteria never
excluded personnel eligible in a previous phase, some drop out
as their actual service time "ages" them out of the required
years-of-service window. The coding for all the data are
included in Appendix B.
The final merged file, comprised of all enlisted Navy
personnel eligible for VSI and SSB in either or both fiscal
1992 and 1993 consisted of 47,261 observations. The number of
personnel eligible for each phase of the separation program
are included in Table 3. The number of people eligible for
both fiscal years exceeds the number of observations in the
final merged data set, since many individuals could have opted
to take the program during both periods.
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TABLE 3
NUMBER OF NAVY ENLISTED PERSONNEL ELIGIBLE FOR












Fiscal 1993 Total 25,465*
Total Eligible in Both 47,261"
Fiscal Years
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center, 1993.
Note:* The number of eligible personnel for both fiscal years
exceeds the number of observations in the three "total" data
sets, since many individuals were eligible to take the program
during both periods.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF MODEL
The model used in this thesis is based on the findings
presented in the literature review. The vast majority of
previous studies used binary and multivariate logit techniques
to study the effects of various factors on retention and
reenlistment decisions. Since the dependent variable here is
the decision to take or not take the bonus, a discrete "yes or
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no" choice, the predicted value of this decision can be
calculated to represent the probability of taking either the
VSI or SSB program.
The binomial logit model is the most commonly used model
in situations where the dependent variable is binary and the
response function is non-linear. The probability that an
individual will take VSI or SSB can be estimated as follows:
Dia 1
1 exp (- (B0÷+Bx.e,))
where Di is the probability of taking the VSI or SSB, the betas
are the parameter estimates, the Xi's are the independent
variables and ci is the stochastic error term. In the logit
model, the estimated values of the coefficients (betas)
indicate the impact of a one-unit change in the corresponding
independent variable on the log of the odds of a given choice,
holding all other independent variables constant [Ref. 22:pp.
518-520].
C. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
The factors determined to be germane in the studies
concerning retention behavior and the effects of reenlistment
bonuses on reenlistment decisions should also prove to be
relevant in this study. Based on the sources discussed in the
literature review and on a concise summary of applicable
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variables produced by Mehay and Kirby (:993), the variables
listed in Table 4 were determined to be of significance to
this study (Ref. 9:p. 5-8]. They were chosen or created from
the variables available in the combined data set. The
definitions and expected signs of the factors used for
descriptive or statistical analysis are discussed in the next
section. The means of the raw data sets are displayed in
Table 5, following the listings of Table 4.
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TABLE 4
NAMES, DEFINITIONS AND VALUES OF VARIABLES USED IN ANALYSIS
VARIABLE DEFINITION VALUES
TAKE Accept separation bonus Accepted VSI/SSB-1
MINORITY White or Non-white Non-white-1
GRADE Paygrade of individual E-6-1
NONGRAD No high school diploma Non-graduate-1
HSGRAD High school diploma HS graduate-1
MARRIED Marital status Married-1
CHILD Number of children Total I children
MALE Gender Male-1
YOS Years of service 8-17 YOS-1
MILSPS Military spouse Military spouse-i
AFQT Armed Forces Qual Test 10-99 Points
HITECH In a high-tech rating High tech-1
ADVRATE Advancement rate, by Percentage
rating
UNRATE Home of record Percentage
unemployment rates
PHASEj Number of phases -1, up to 7 phases
eligible
Source: Derived from Mehay and Kirby (1993).
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TABLE 5
MEANS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR
PROGRAM-ELIGIBLE ENLISTED PERSONNEL, BY FISCAL YEAR
MEAN
VARIABLE BOTH FISCAL FISCAL 92 ONLY FISCAL 93 ONLY
YEARS COMBINED
MINORITY .250 .275 .207
GRADE .603 .659 .575
NONGRAD .130 .141 .107
KSGRAD .835 .824 .860
MARRIED .785 .784 .788
CHILD 2.144 2.171 2.114
MALE .901 .894 .920
YOS 12.464 12.881 12.322
MILSPS .061 .061 .G60
AFQT 60.878 59.231 64.630
HITECH .242 .218 .355
ADVRATE 11.670 21.175 5.255
UNRATE 7.352 7.332 7.287
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center, 1993.
1. DEPENDENT VARIABLE
The dependent variable, TAKE, was developed from the
original PROGRAM variable, which was used to code records with
respect to the type of program accepted by individuals. TAKE
was set equal to zero to reflect either acceptance of the VSI
or SSB, and TAKE-I when neither program was accepted. This
coding is the opposite of what would normally be expected
because of the ordered value approach used by SAS. In this
approach, the lower value is considered as "the event" and the
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higher value as "no event." Thus, TAKE must be coded zero
for the model to estimate the probability of taking VSI or SSB
[Ref. 23:p. 1072].
2. INDEPENDENT (EXPLANATORY) VARIABLES
The explanatory variables are classified into five
categories: demographic, tenure, occupational, educational,
and economic factors. In addition, a PHASE variable is
included that is the heart of the longitudinal analysis.
Following descriptions of each of these independent variables,
the means, broken out by fiscal year, are presented in Table
5.
a. Demographic Variables
(1) MARRIED is a dummy variable used to signify
marital status, with not married the omitted condition. This
variable was constructed from the original MS (marital status)
variable. The coefficient of MARRIED is expected to be
negative, reflecting historically higher reenlistment rates
demonstrated by married service members.
(2) MILSPS (military spouse) is a dummy variable
set=l when a service member is married to a military spouse.
It is hypothesized that the coefficient of MILSPS will be
positive, reflecting an expected tendency to accept the
separation incentive based on the difficulties in managing
dual military careers. However, the fact that both military
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spouses in a family are unlikely to leave the service at the
same time may reduce the significance of this variable.
(3) MALE (gender) is a dummy variable set-1 for
males. Its coefficient is expected to be negative, for womeri
have generally exhibited a lower likelihood than their male
counterparts of remaining in the Navy beyond a first term
[Ref. 24:p. 63].
(4) CHILD is a continuous variable that was coded
using the variable DEPS. It includes both married and single
parents. The coefficient is expected to be negative, since
previous studies have shown a tendency for service members to
remain in the service as the number of dependent children
.&ncreases [Ref. 24:p. 45].
(5) MINORITY is a dummy explanatory variable used
to code the ethnic origin of the eligible individuals. The
omitted condition is Caucasian, which occurs when the original
variable RACE=I. The coefficient for MINORITY is expected to
be negative, based on prior evidence that minorities tend to
reenlist at higher rates than whites [Ref. 24:p. 45].
b. Tenure variables
(1) YOS (years of service) is a continuous variable
that ranges from eight to seventeen years (per program
eligibility requirements) to reflect the amount of time
specific individuals have served in the Navy. This should be
considered the least accurate of the variables in this study
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as it was developed differently for the different fiscal year
data sets.
The ACOL model suggests that a person's
propensity to leave the Navy decreases as YOS increases. As
tenure increases, the time to retirement decreases with a
corresponding increase in the cost of leaving. In addition,
the "job-matching" associated with increasing years of service
reflects the fit between the individual and military service.
The result is that persons with longer tenure tend to
demonstrate lower "quit" rates [Ref. 9:p. 6].
(2) GRADE (paygrade), limited by eligibility
criteria to E-5 and E-6 (for fiscal 1992) and E-5 through E-7
(for fiscal 1993), was coded as GRADE=1 when PG-E-6. Though
some correlation with YOS will exist, an independent effect
may occur as a result of the higher pay associated with higher
paygrades. This separate effect should cause its coefficient
to be negative, since persons in higher grades are less likely
to separate from the Navy through the VSI and SSB program.
c. Occupational Variables
(1) The HITECH (highly technical) ratings were
included to reflect the probable civilian opportunities
available to those with the most extensive and technical
training. The ten Navy ratings were grouped according to
previous research and are generally considered most likely to
have direct civilian equivalents (Ref. 25]. This civilian
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equivalence should result in a positive coefficient,
reflecting a tendency of persons in HITECH ratings to accept
the separation incentive.
(2) ADVRATE (advancement rate) is a continuous
variable included to reflect the effect of promotion
opportunities on the decision to "take" the separation bonus.
It was created by using the promotion information from periods
closest to the program offering dates. There are separate
rates for both fiscal 1992 and fiscal 1993, since there are
also separate advancement rates by rating and paygrade.
Although the advancement opportunities for the ratings in this
group are below the Navy average (as a result of their
inclusion in the eligible population due to current or
projected overmanning), it is felt that there is sufficient
variation within this group to capture differences in
acceptance behavior. As the ADVRATE increases, the
coefficient should be negative, reflecting a decreasing
tendency to take the separation bonus as a result of increased
opportunity for advancement and increased pay.
d. Educational Variables
(1) AFQT is a continuous variable of raw scores on
the Armed Forces Qualification Test. Persons with higher AFQT
scores have generally displayed a greater tendency to leave
the Navy for various reasons, including better opportunities
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for civilian employment [Ref. 24:p. 63]. The sign of this
coefficient, therefore, is hypothesized to be positive.
(2) NONGRAD (non-high school graduate) is one of
the dummy variables used to document the level of education
attained by individuals eligible for VSI and SSB. NONGRAD
equals one if an individual has not received a high school
diploma. This attribute should decrease the probability of
accepting the separation bonus.
(3) HSGRAD (high school graduate) is the other
dummy variable used to indicate education level. It is equal
to one when the individual has at least a high school diploma.
The omitted condition is some college or college completion.
e. Economic Variable
(1) UNRATE (unemployment rate) is the continuous
variable used to represent the economic and employment
conditions facing eligible individuals. Based on the home of
record state of each individual, it has been separated into
variables representing both fiscal 1992 and fiscal 1993.
f. Phase Variables
(1) PHASE (1-7) is a set of dummy variables that
have been included to allow for the analysis of the effects of
eligibility for a number of phases. They were developed by
first coding each observation with the variable OA (offered
and accepted). The OA variable used the eligibility criteria
for each of the seven overall phases of the VSI and SSB
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program up to the point where either a "take" decision is
made, the end of a fiscal year arrives, or the member is no
longer eligible. Following this process, data sets were
constructed for each of the seven phases. Each of these phase
data sets consists of the following:
"* a PH variable, which is set equal to one if that specific
phase is the initial phase an individual is eligible for
VSI or SSB;
"* a TAKE variable, used later in the logit and linear
probability models to indicate program acceptance, and;
"* PHSE1 through PHSE7 dummy variables, which are used to
indicate continued or multiple eligibility. For example,
in the phase 3 data set an individual eligible for the
third time will code PHSE3-l, with PHSE1, PHSE2 and PHSEs
4-7 equal to zero.
Following the construction of these seven data
sets, the observations were stacked into one large set
composed of 115,698 observations, even though there are only
47,261 individual program participants. Each of these
observations represents an "opportunity," for an eligible
individual to accept voluntary separation. The sign of these
variables, when compared to PHASE67, the omitted condition,
should be positive, with the coefficients decreasing in size
as the number of opportunities increases. 5 The coding for the
OA and PHSE variables are also included in Appendix A. Table
6 presents the means of each of the "stacked" data sets,
representing the total number of "opportunities" of the
5The variables PHSE6 and PHSE7 had to be combined as neither
individual variable had sufficient variance in the dependent
variable to allow for the logit process to "converge."
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independent variables for the combined set of eligibles and
for each fiscal year of eligibility.
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TABLE 6
NEANS OF ALL VARIABLES, BASED ON TOTAL NUMBER OF
"OPPORTUNITIES" TO SELECT VII OR 82B,
FISCAL YEARS 1992 AND 1993
MEAN
VARIABLE ALL ELIGIBLES ONLY ELIGIDLE ONLY EIGIBLE
FISCAL 1992 FISCAL 193W
TAKE .054 .079 .071
MINORITY .257 .319 .192
GRADE .625 619 .486
NONGRAD .129 .164 .093
HSGRAD .a36 .799 .871
MARRIED .786 .781 .783
CHILD 2.155 2.195 2.02l
MALE .903 .A76 .911
YOS 12.620 13.283 11.561
MILSPS .059 .061 .066
AFOT 60.9•0 59.169 65.603
HITECH .260 .066 .278
ADVRATE2 21.955 18.391 N/A
UNRATE2 7.296 7.430 N/A
ADVRATE3 5.143 N/A 5.661
UNRATE3 7287 N/A 7.261
PHSE1 .406 .505 .511
PHSE2 .296 .311 .335
PHSE3 .176 .131 .154
PHSE4 .105 .053 N/A
PHSES .011 N/A N/A
PHSEG .003 N/A N/A
PHSE7 .001 N/A N/A
PHSE67 .003 N/A N/A
urce: Derived from provided by the Deen manpower Data flnter, 19
N/A - not applicable.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
A. ORGANIZATION OF ANALYSIS
Several different approaches are taken to answer the
primary research question posed in this thesis. First, the
fully-coded, "stacked" data file was broken into groups based
on the phase during which VSI or SSB was accepted by eligible
personnel. With this completed, the mean characteristics of
personnel "taking" the separation bonus during their initial
eligibility were compared to the mean characteristics of those
taking the bonus during a later phase of eligibility. This
comparison of means of the independent variables was conducted
on the combined fiscal 1992 and fiscal 1993 data, and on both
of the years separately. The differences of these means were
then analyzed through the use of a t-test to determine
statistical significance.
The second approach required the development and use of
the PHSE variables to allow for a longitudinal bivariate
analysis. This approach was developed in conjunction with
Professor Paul Hogan of George Mason University and Professor
Steve Mehay of the Naval Postgraduate School. The size and
direction of the coefficient of each of the PHSE variables
should provide an indication of the differences in the
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propensity of individuals to take either VSI or SSB when they
are first eligible or later in the fiscal year.
Some problems came to light when constructing this model.
First, a true longitudinal model requires that the time
elapsed between events (for example, between the notification
of the bonus availaoility and deadline for application) to be
of equal length. In this case, the equal length would give
the eligible individuals the same opportunity in which to make
their decision. The lengths of the phases for both years
ranged from 21 to 40 days in duration. Though obviously not
of equal length, the assumption was made that the associated
time differences would not invalidate the model.
A second, more serious problem, arose when the model was
run on the data set consisting of "take opportunities" over
both years in question. As mentioned in Chapter III, neither
PHSE6 nor PHSE7 provided a sufficient number of observations
to allow for convergence of the logit model, necessitating the
combination of PHSE6 and PHSE7 into a single variable.
Although this eliminated one of the phases, it should have
little effect on the model, since the number of people
eligible for phases 6 or 7, separately, is very small.
Another possible problem with the combined model concerns
the break in eligibility between the fiscal 1992 and fiscal
1993 programs. Individuals eligible during fiscal 1993,
whether they were eligible or not in fiscal 1992, would base
their decisions n different information and over a longer
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time period than persons eligible during fiscal 1992. With
this in mind, a longitudinal model was estimated separately
for persons eligible for the VSI and SSB program during fiscal
1992 and those eligible during fiscal 1993. Following this,
the model was run on a data set comprised of only individuals
with take opportunities in both fiscal 1992 and fiscal 1993.
These results, when compared with the model that included both
years, should provide additional insight into the take
behavior of eligible individuals.
In conjunction with the bivariate analysis of the logit
models, the "notional person" approach was also used to
determine the effects that the individual explanatory
variables have on the probability of accepting a separation
bonus. This method of analysis defines the notional person by
assigning the mean characteristics from each of the data sets
used in the analysis to this "notional" individual. The
coefficients from the estimated logit models are used to
calculate the total probability of voluntary program
acceptance. As each of the explanatory variables are changed
by one unit, the change in probability of program acceptance
for each of the independent variables can be determined. It
was felt that this would provide a clearer picture of the
effects of the number of phases in which an individual is
eligible on the probability of program acceptance. This,
however, did not prove to be the case. The total
probabilities associated with the notional persons resulting
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from these data sets were extremely small, as were the changes
in acceptance probability due to changes in the explanatory
variables. For this reason, the results of the notional
person analysis is only presented for the initial data set, to
provide an indication of the types of results achieved.
Finally, a multinomial logit model was developed and run
on the same data sets as discussed above. This model involves
a three-level response for the dependent variable. For
example, a dependent variable is created, MULTI, and set equal
to one if a sailor selected either VSI or SSB the initial time
eligible; set equal to 2 if the take decision were made in a
later phase; and equal to 3 if an individual were eligible
during the year but never took the bonus. The results consist
of two coefficients for each of the explanatory variables.
The first value, or coefficient, is the log of the relative
probability of program acceptance when first eligible to the
relative probability of the base case, refusal to choose
voluntary separation at all (ln (P,/P 3)). The second
coefficient is the log of the relative probability of taking
in a later period relative to the base case (ln (P2/P 3)).
B. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS
Since the focus of this study is on the timing of the
acceptance decision for those selecting the separation bonus,
personnel taking the bonus will be the focus of the data
analysis. This section describes and compares the data for
46
four different populations of takers: (a) of persons eligible
during any portion of fiscal 1992 and fiscal 1993, those who
took the first phase they were eligible compared with those
who took during a later phase; (b) of persons eligible during
fiscal 1992, those who took the first phase they were eligible
compared with those who took during a later phase; (c) of
persons eligible during fiscal 1993, and of persons eligible
during fiscal 1993 2a1y, those who took the first phase they
were eligible compared with those who took during a later
phase; and (d) of persons who were eligible in both fiscal
1992 and fiscal 1993, those who took the separation bonus the
first phase they were eligible in fiscal 1993 compared with
those who took during a later fiscal 1993 phase. A
description of each of these groups of data is presented,
along with a table showing the means of the explanatory
variables for each group of individuals.
1. COMBINED FISCAL-YEAR ELIGIBILITY
In all, 47,261 Navy enlisted men and women were
eligible to take VSI and SSB during fiscal 1992 and fiscal
1993. Of these individuals, 13.3 percent (6,270), accepted a
bonus and voluntarily separated from the Navy through this
program. Of those taking the separation bonus, 66.6 percent
(or 4,177) did so during the first phase they were eligible,
while the remaining number (2,093) opted for the voluntary
separation bonus in a phase other than when first eligible.
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Table 7 lists the means for the relevant variables for both
samples and t-tests of differences in the means between the
two groups.6
TABLE 7
MEANS OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES:
FIRST PHASE ELIGIBLE TAKERS VS. LATER PHASE TAXERS,
FISCAL 1992 AND 1993
VARIABLE TOOK FIRST TOOK OTHER THAN T-VALUE
PHASE ELIGIBLE FIRST PHASE
MINORITY (%) .144 .188 -4.5196***
GRADE (% E-6) .547 .558 -. 8083
NONGRAD (%) .161 .151 .9653
HSGRAD (%) .811 .819 -. 7945
MARRIED (%) .767 .757 .8802
CHILD (number) 2.070 2.129 -1.4516
MALE (%) .879 .885 -. 7735
YOS (years) 11.780 12.104 -4.9787***
MILSPS (%) .064 .062 .3138
AFQT (score) 64.077 63.318 1.4172
HITECH (%) .318 .334 -1.2798
ADVRATE (% X 100) 14.176 10.685 8.9457***
UNRATE (% X 100) 7.216 7.340 -3.0103***
SAMPLE SIZE 4,177 2,093 _ _---
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center, 1993.
*** Indicates differences significant at .01 level
6T-scores are the results of statistical tests used to
investigate the differences in means of different variables. These
scores are used to determine the statistical significance of the
differences in the means.
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Notable differences in the characteristics between
persons accepting during initial eligibility and those
accepting during a later phase can be seen in four of the
explanatory variables: MINORITY, YOS, ADVRATE and UNRATE.
According to these differences, a higher proportion of
minorities opted to take the incentive during the later
phases. Also, those who took in a later phase had slightly
more service time. Surprisingly, persons with higher
advancement rates in their ratings are more likely to accept
when first offered. Consistent with expectations, however, is
the fact that those with a lower unemployment rate in their
home of record are more likely to accept when first eligible
rather than during a later phase. The differences in the
means for these variables between the two groups are
significant at the .01 level.
2. FISCAL 1992 "TAKERS" ONLY
Of the 34,916 individuals who were eligible for early
separation during fiscal 1992, 9.8 percent (or 3,439) elected
to "take" a separation bonus. Of these takers, 72.7 percent,
(or 2,501), made their decision during the first phase they
were eligible rather than waiting for a later eligibility
phase. Table 8 lists the means for the relevant variables for




MEANS OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES:
FIRST PHASE ELIGIBLE TAKERS VS. LATER TAKERS,
FISCAL 1992
VARIABLE TOOK FISCAL 1992
FIRST PHASE OTHER PHASE T-VALUZ
MINORITY (%) .160 .203 -2.9660***
GRADE (% E-6) .598 .530 3.6059***
NONGRAD (%) .198 .195 .1871
HSGRAD (%) .773 .771 .0791
MARRIED (%) .765 .764 .0945
CHILD (number) 2.142 2.190 -. 8143
MALE (%) .856 .869 -. 9642
YOS (years) 12.633 13.107 -6.2407***
MILSPS (%) .069 0.060 .9529
AFQT (score) 61.556 58.559 3.9412***
HITECH (%) .242 .213 1.7948*
ADVRATE (% X 100) 19.534 18.118 2.1804**
UNRATE (% X 100) 7.158 7.258 -1.5663
SAMPLE SIZE 2506 940 N/A
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center, 1993.
***,(**),(*) indicate significance at .01, .05 and.10 level
When the sailors who accepted the program during the
initial phase of eligibility are subtracted from the total
eligible population, 32,415 persons remain. Of this number,
15,798 were only eligible during the final (fourth) phase of
fiscal 1992 and thus, were not eligible to take during a later
phase that year. Therefore, 16,612 sailors were eligible for
more than one phase during fiscal 1992. Of this group, 5.7
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percent (940 of 16,612) accepted during a phase other than
that in which they were initially eligible.
Significant statistical differences, at various levels
of significance, exist between these two population subgroups
for six of the independent variables: MINORITY, GRADE, YOS,
AFQT, HITECH and ADVRATE. A higher proportion of minorities
accept in a later round, and those who select in a later round
have higher YOS. On the other hand, persons in a higher
paygrade, with higher AFQT scores, serving in a highly
technical rating or in a rating with a better advancement rate
tend to separate when first eligible.
3. FISCAL 1993 "TAKERS" ONLY
In all, 24,174 Navy enlisted personnel were #'igible
for the VSI and SSB programs during fiscal 1993. Of these
eligibles, 11.7 percent (2,824) chose to leave the Navy
voluntarily through this program. Of individuals who opted to
select either VSI or SSB during fiscal 1993, 91.9 percent
(2,595 out of 2,824) did so when first eligible this fiscal
year.
Of this group, 12,345 were VSI and SSB eligible for
the first time during fiscal 1993, with a 13.9 percent take
rate (1,718 of 12,345). Of the 1,718 takers, an astounding
97.7 percent (1,671) did so the initial phase eligible. Only
47 persons who were eligible for the first time during the
fiscal 1993 program offering, who were eligible for more than
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one phase, accepted a separation during a later phase. Table
9 lists the means for the relevant variables for both samples
and t-tests of differences in the means between the two
groups. None of the differences in characteristics of this
group are statistically significant.
TABLE 9
MEANS OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES:
FIRST PHASE ELIGIBLE TAKERS VS. OTHER TAEERS,
FISCAL 1993 ELIGIBILITY ONLY
VARIABLE TOOK FISCAL 1993
FIRST PHASE OTHER PHASE T-VALUE
MINORITY (%) .118 .064 1.1496
GRADE (% E-6) .472 .362 1.4888
NONGRAD (%) .106 .064 .9290
HSGRAD (%) .868 .872 -. 0917
MARRIED (%) .770 .723 .7502
CHILD (number) 1.962 1.872 .4110
MALE (%) .912 .872 .9418
YOS (years) 10.512 9.969 1.3541
MILSPS (%) .057 .064 -. 1850
AFQT (score) 67.858 67.574 .9210
HITECH (%) .433 .362 .9768
ADVRATE (% X 100) 5.932 6.027 -. 1428
UNRATE (% X 100) 7.303 7.249 .2688
SAMPLE SIZE 1671 47 N/A
Source: Derived fro a provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center, 1993.
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When the 1,671 persons who accepted the program when
first eligible and the 2,926 who were only eligible during one
phase are removed from this group, 7,748 persons remain
eligible for more than one phase during fiscal 1993. Only
0.61 percent of these sailors voluntarily separated from the
Navy during a later eligible phase.
4. FISCAL 1993 TAKERS WHO WERE ALSO ELIGIBLE IN FISCAL
1992
This final group of takers includes 11,829 individuals
eligible for the voluntary separation program in fiscal 1992,
did not elect to separate at that time, and were eligible
again at some point in fiscal 1993. Of these personnel, 9.4
percent (or 1,106) decided to accept either VSI or SSB during
one of the three fiscal 1993 phases. Like the other take
populations previously discussed, a majority (83.54 percent,
or 924 of 1,106 takers) of these individuals chose to accept
the voluntary separation bonus when first eligible.
When the sailors who accepted the program during the
initial phase of eligibility of fiscal 1993 are subtracted
from this total eligible population, 10,905 persons remain.
Of this number, 683 were only eligible during one of the
phases during fiscal 1993 and were not eligible to take during
a later phase that year. This leaves 10,222 persons eligible
for more than one phase during fiscal 1993. 1.8% of this
group (182 of 10,222) accepted during a phase other than that
during which they were initially eligible. It appears that
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the overall percentage of individuals taking the separation
bonus after being eligible during a previous fiscal year is
4.5 percentage points lower than the percentage of those
accepting who were not eligible during a previous period. As
was the case with every group, the vast majority of takers did
so when first eligible. When individuals were eligible during
fiscal 1992 and fiscal 1993, though, this percentage was the
lowest of any of the groups examined. A complete listing of
explanatory variables, means, and t-scores follows in Table
10.
The independent variables GRADE, CHILD, YOS and HITECH
all have statistically significant differences in means
between the two subgroups. Individuals in lower paygrades,
who have less time in service and fewer children are more,
rather than less, likely to take the bonus when first offered.
In addition, those in highly-technical ratings are also more
likely to take the bonus during initial eligibility.
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TABLE 10
MEANS OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES:
FIRST PHASE ELIGIBLE TAKERS VS. LATER PHASE TAKERS,
FISCAL 1992 AND 1993
VARIABLE TAKERS
FIRST PHASE OTHER PHASE T-VALUE
MINORITY (%) .181 .176 .1575
GRADE (% E-6) .578 .654 -1.9052*
NONGRAD (%) .119 .115 .1397
HSGRAD (%) .854 .874 -. 6948
MARRIED (%) .752 .758 -. 1736
CHILD (number) 2.038 2.341 -2.5142**
MALE (%) .900 .896 .1980
YOS (years) 11.258 11.774 -3.0377**
MILSPS (%) .063 .071 -. 0352
AFQT (score) 67.079 67.709 -. 3957
HITECH (%) .448 .379 1.7145*
ADVRATE (% X 100) 4.548 4.739 -. 6743
UNRATE (% X 100) 7.398 7.492 -. 8675
N 924 182 N/A
Source: Derived from data proviced by the Defense Manpower
Data Center, 1993.
*0, * indicate significance at .05 and .10 level
C. BINOMIAL ANALYSIS
This section explores the results of the logit models on
all four of the "stacked" data sets previously developed: the
combined set containing all take opportunities for both fiscal
1992 and 1993, the data set comprised of opportunities during
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fiscal 1992 only, the set containing only the opportunities
present during fiscal 1993, and, finally, the stacked data set
that holds only fiscal 1993 opportunities that correspond to
individuals also eligible during fiscal 1992.
The results of the logit model are discussed below for
each of the models corresponding to these data sets. It must
be kept in mind that the "take" probability in these models
refers to the decision to take in one of what may be several
phases for which an individual is eligible. Thus, the size of
these coefficients may be much smaller than in other studies
of VSI and SSB acceptance behavior, as it is concerned with
acceptance "opportunities" as opposed to specific individual
decisions. This difference in data set composition
drastically increases the number of observations while holding
constant the number of take decisions, thus reducing the take
probability.
Following the discussion of the logit model is an analysis
of the marginal probabilities associated with each of the
independent variables used in the model. This analysis, using
the "notional person" technique, provides arn estimate of the
independent effects of each of these variables on the take
decision.
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1. COMBINED FISCAL YEAR TAKE OPPORTUNITIES
a. BINARY LOGIT MODEL
The first data set contains 115,060 observations.
These observations represent all of the "opportunities" that
individuals had to accept the separation bonus during fiscal
1992 and 1993. Out of these opportunities, there were 6,216
takers, resulting in a take rate of 5.4 percent. In the logit
model associated with this data set, the combined variable
PHSE67 (representing phases 6 and 7 in fiscal 1993) is the
omitted condition. Table 11 presents the results of the logit
model for this data set. This table displays the estimated
logit coefficients and, for ease of interpretation, converted
coefficients. The conversions represent the effect of a one-
unit increase of an explanatory variable on the probability of
accepting either the VSI or SSB, holding all other variables
constant at their mean value.7
All but two of the explanatory variables, MILSPS
and PHSE2, are statistically significant. The direction of
all the coefficients agree with the results obtained by Mehay
and Kirby with the exception of ADVRATE. Aside from the fact
that the impact of this variable is extremely small (a 1-
percent increase in the advancement rate causes a 0.1 percent
7This procedure is valid only for individuals with attributee5
corresponding to the independent variables at the mean, but is t
good approximation for the change in acceptance probability for all
observations, except for individuals with values near the upper or
lower limits of the variable values.
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change in the probability of acceptance), the wide variance in
the values for this variable both within individual years and
between fiscal 1992 and fiscal 1993 (along with the inclusion
of the PHSE variables) could explain the disparity. The
remainder of the variables have signs that agree with the
original hypotheses.
Four of the five PHSE variables are statistically
significant. Of those that are significant, only PHSE1 is
positive. This indicates that individuals are 3.6 percent
more likely to accept VSI or SSB in the first phase they are
eligible than they are in the sixth or seventh phase of
eligibility, all other factors held constant. In addition,
the negative coefficients on PHSE3, PHSE4 and PHSE5 suggest
that, holding all other explanatory variables equal,
individuals are less likely to accept the separation bonus
during the third, fourth and fifth phases of eligibility than
in the sixth or seventh phase.
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TABLE 11
LOGIT COEFFICIENTS OF "TAKE" NODEL, ALL ELIGIBLEZS
FISCAL 1992 AND 1993
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE LOGIT COEFFICIENT CHANGE IN
ACCEPTANCE PROMBIUTf"
MINORITY -.5655w-




















urce: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center, 1993.
NOTE:
0 Based on estimates from a linear probability model
b Concordance ratio Is a measure of the predictive ability of the model
"*** pc-.01; ** p< ,.05; * pc =.10
Sample size is 115,060 observations
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b. NOTIONAL PMRSON ANALYSIS
The primary notional person for the first data set
has the following attributes: white, paygrade E-6, high
school graduate, married with 2.2 children, male, 12.62 years
in the service, an AFQT score in the 61st percentile, in a
non-technical rating that has an advancement rate of 10.1
percent, and from a state with an unemployment rate of 7.34
percent. This notional person has a probability of acceptance
in phase 6 or phase 7 of 2.5 percent. A complete listing of
the marginal probabilities associated with this notional
person and a similar individual as an E-5, with changes in
probabilities resulting from changing personal and
organizational characteristics, is included in Table 12.
It appears that the E-5 notional person has a 1.1
percent higher probability of accepting the separation bonus
in phase six or seven than does the E-6 notional person. For
both of these notional people, the probability of program
acceptance is most affected by the variables PHSE1 (from among
the pha ' variables) and MALE (of the remainder of the
variables). The probability that program acceptance will be
in the first phase of eligibility rather than in the sixth or
seventh phase increases the overall acceptance probability by




ACCEPTANCE PROBABILITIES BASED ON NOTIONAL PERSON CONCEPT,
WITH PROBABILITIES RESULTING FROM
UNIT CHANGES IN EXPLANATORY VARIABLES,
FOR DIFFERENT NOTIONAL PERSONS,
FISCAL 1992 AND FISCAL 1993 TAKE OPPORTUNITIES
NOTIONAL PERSON: WHITE, E-6, H.S. GRAD, MARRIED, 2.16CHILDREN, MALE, 12.62 YOS, NON-MILITARY SPOUSE, AFQT OF60.98, NON-TECH RATING, 10.13 percent ADVANCEMENT RATE,
7.34 percent UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
OVERALL ACCEPTANCE PROBABILITY = 0.025





EXTRA YEAR OF SERVICE 
-0.004
10 POINT AFQT INCREASE NO CHANGE
HIGHLY TECHNICAL RATING +0.010
PHSE1 +0.036
PHSE2 +0.011
NOTIONAL PERSON: WHITE, E-5, H.S. GRAD, MARRIED, 2.16CHILDREN, MALE, 12.62 YOS, NON-MILITARY SPOUSE, AFQT OF60.98, NON-TECH RATING, 10.13 percent ADVANCEMENT RATE,
7.34 percent UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
OVERALL ACCEPTANCE PROBABILITY = 0.036





EXTRA YEAR OF SERVICE 
-0.040
10 POINT AFQT INCREASE +0.001
HIGHLY TECHNICAL RATING +0.016
PHSE1 +0.053
PHSE2 +0.017Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center, 1993.
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2. FISCAL 1992 TAKE OPPORTUNITIES
This data set contains 43,398 observations,
representing the "opportunities" available for eligible
individuals to accept the separation bonus during fiscal 1992.
There were 3,434 takers in this data set, resulting in an
overall take rate of 7.9 percent. In this logit model, PHSE4,
the last phase available, is the omitted condition. Table 13
presents the results of the logit model for this data set,
with the estimated coefficients, converted coefficients, and
levels of significance.
Three of the variables are not significant in this
model. In addition to MILSPS (also not significant in t.,L
previous model), HSGRAD and PHSE3 are not significant in tLe
acceptance model for fiscal 1992. The variable HITECH has an
especially large effect on the acceptance probability, as
individuals in a highly technical rating are 13.6 percent more
likely to accept either VSI or SSB than are those in less
technical ratings. On the other hand, marriage, cr increases
in the number of children, longevity, AFQT, and advancement
and unemployment rates, all other things equal, affect the
probability of acceptance by less than 1 percent. As in the
previous model, the -jgns of the coefficients of all the




LOGIT COEFFICIENTS OF "TAKE" MODEL, ALL ELIGIBLES,
FISCAL 1992






















urce: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center, 1993.
NOTES:
"Based on estimates from a linear probability model
b Concordance ratio is a measure of the predictive ability of the model
** p< a.01; ** p< a.05
Of the PHSE variables, only PHSE1 and PHSE2 are
statistically significant. These variables represent the
first and second "take" opportunities for each individual,
respectively. According to the results of this model, the
63
change in acceptance probability is 8.8 percent higher for
individuals during the first phase of eligibility over the
fourth phase. However, the acceptance probability is only 4
percent greater for the second phase as opposed to the fourth
phase.
3. FISCAL 1993 TAKE OPPORTUNITIES
Enlisted Navy personnel who were eligible for VSI and
SSB in fiscal 1993 only experienced 24,118 opportunities to
take the separation bonus. The 1,672 takers in this data set
produced a take rate of 6.9 percent. In this logit model,
PHSE3, the last phase available during fiscal 1993, is the
omitted condition. Table 14 presents the results of the logit
model for this data set, with the estimated logit
coefficients, converted coefficients, and levels of
significance.
Three of the variables are not significant in this
model. In addition to MILSPS, (also not significant in the
previous model), MARRIED and AFQT are not significant in
explaining the acceptance probability of eligible individuals
during fiscal 1993. None of the non-phase variables have a
large effect on the acceptance probability, and only three of
these variables--MINORITY, NONGRAD and HITECH--change this
probability by more than 3.0 percent points. Unlike the
previous two models, the signs of the coefficients of both
ADVRATE and UNRATE disagree with the hypothesized signs. This
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positive effect of increasing unemployment rates on the
acceptance probability is barely significant at the .10 level
and is extremely small (0.2 percent increase in acceptance
probability per unit increase in the unemployment rate).
TABLE 14
LOGIT COEFFICIENTS OF 9°TAKE"' MODEL, ALL ELIGIBLES,
FIS8CAL 1993





















Lurce: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Cnter, 1993.
NOTE.
, Based on estimates from a linear probability model
b Concordance ratio is a measure of the predictive ability of the model
"p<- ,.01; te p< W.05; * pC &.10
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Both PHSE1 and PHSE2 are statistically significant at
the .01 level. The coefficients for these variables imply
that there is a 14 percent increase in the probability of
acceptance of VSI or SSB in the first phase eligible as
opposed to the third phase, for individuals first of
eligibility during fiscal 1993. There is a 1.7 percent
increase in this probability with the variable PHSE2.
4. FISCAL 1993 TAKE OPPORTUNITIES OF INDIVIDUALS ALSO
ELIGIBLE IN FISCAL 1992
This data set contains 30,226 observations that
represent the take "opportunities" available to individuals
previously eligible in fiscal 1992, who are also eligible to
accept the separation bonus during fiscal 1993. Of these
twice-eligible personnel, 1,106 opted to take the separation
bonus, with a take rate of 3.7 percent. In this logit model,
as in the previous model, PHSE3, the last available phase, is
the omitted condition. Table 15 presents the results of the
logit model for this data set, with estimated logit
coefficients, converted coefficients, and levels of
significance.
The coefficients of three of the variables, MALE,
MILSPS and HITECH, are not statistically significant in
explaining the acceptance probability in this model. Again,
none of the non-phase variables display a large effect on the
acceptance probability. NONGRAD has the largest effect on the
acceptance probability of these variables, with non-high
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school graduates 1.9 percent more likely to separate
voluntarily. Unlike the three previous models, only the sign
of the coefficient of UNRATE disagrees with the hypothesized
signs.
Of the PHSE variables, PHSE1 and PHSE2 are
statistically significant. These variables represent the
first and second "take" opportunities for each individual,
respectively. According to the results of this model, an
individual who was eligible during the previous fiscal year is
6.3 percent more likely to accept the voluntary separation
program during the first eligible phase of the following
fiscal year than in the last eligible phase. Surprisingly,
the acceptance probability decreases by 1 percentage point for
the second phase as opposed to the third phase.
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TABLE 15
LOGIT COEFFICIENTS OF "TAKE" MODELp ONLY ELIGIBLE
BOTH FISCAL 1992 AND 1993





















Surce: Derived from data provided By the Defense Manpower Data Center, 1993.
NOTE:
B ased on estimates from a linear probability model
b Concordance ratio is a measure of the predictive ability of the model
*** p< w.01; ** p < w.05
D. MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ANALYSIS
This section discusses the results of the multinomial
logit models on the four "stacked" data sets developed for
this study. Tables 16 through 19 present the results of these
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models for both the relative probability of program acceptance
during the first phase an individual is eligible, compared to
not taking the program at all, and on the relative probability
of taking the incentive during a later period of eligibility,
also compared to not taking it at all. Rather than focusing
on the importance of the different phases of eligibility on
the take decision, this section should provide some insight on
the potential differences in the effects of individual
explanatory variables on the decision to accept the separation
bonus during a specific phase, as opposed to accepting the
bonus at all.
1. COXBINED FISCAL YEAR TAKE OPPORTUNITIES
The results obtained when the multivariate model is
run on the combined data set are presented in Table 16. All
of the coefficients are statistically significant except for
MILSPS and UNRATE in both equations. The signs of the
coefficients agree with expectations, with the exception (as
was the case with the binary logit) of ADVRATE. For the
coefficients that are statistically significant, the signs are
the same for the first and second equations, which indicates
that the explanatory variables have similar effects on the
phase-dependent acceptance decision. The magnitude of the




NULTINOMIAL LOGIT RESULTS SHOWING RELATIVE PROBA.BILXTY OF
TAKING IN FIRST OR LATER PHASE ELIGIBLE
COMPARED TO NOT TAKING AT ALLL
















Source: Derived from data developed by the Defense Manpower
Data Center, 1993.
NOTES:
a PI/P 3 is the relative probability of taking VSI or SSB
during the first eligible phase, compared to not taking the
bonus at all.
b P2/P 3 is the relative probability of taking VSI or SSB
during any other eligible phase, compared to not taking the
bonus at all.
*** p<=.01; ** p<=.05;
The variable MINORITY has the largest relative effect
on the decision to take the separation bonus when first
eligible. In addition, its effect on the decision to take in
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the initial phase of eligibility is nearly twice as large as
on the "other" response, suggesting that minorities are half
as likely to accept VSI or SSB when first offered as opposed
to taking the bonus during a later phase. The remainder of
the variables are much more similar in magnitude between
responses. The fact that the differences between the
estimated coefficients are very small suggests that the simple
binomial logit model provides an adequate representation of
the take decision-making process.
2. FISCAL 1992 TAKE OPPORTUNITIES
The results obtained when the multivariate model is
run on the fiscal 1992 data set are presented in Table 17.
The coefficients for MILSPS and HSGRAD are not statistically
significant for either equation. This is also true for the
second equation for YOS and AFQT. The signs of the
coefficients agree with those hypothesized with the exception,
again, of ADVRATE. Of the coefficients that are statistically
significant, the signs between the first and second equations
are in agreement.
Two of the independent variables, HITECH and MINORITY,
have the largest relative effect on the decision to take the
separation bonus when first eligible. There is little
difference in the size of these or any other of the
coefficients between the two equations. This lack of
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differences reinforces the legitimacy of the simple binary
logit as providing a sufficient model for this process.
TABLE 17
XULTINOMIAL LOGIT RESULTS SNOWING RELATIVE PROBABILITY
OF TAKING IN FIRST OR LATER PHASE ETIGIBLBE
COMPARED TO NOT TAKING AT ALL#
















Source: Derived from data developed by the Defense Manpower
Data Center, 1993.
NOTES:
I P3 /P 3 is the relative probability of taking VSI or SSB
during the first eligible phase, compared to not taking the
bonus at all.
b p2/p3 is the relative probability of taking VSI or SSB
during any other eligible phase, compared to not taking the
bonus at all.
00* p<-.01; ** p<-.05; * p<-.10
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3. FISCAL 1993 TAKE OPPORTUNITIES
Table 18 lists the results of the multinomial model
when run on the data set consisting of take opportunities for
individuals eligible during fiscal 1993 only. Of the 13
explanatory variables used with the model for this data set,
only MINORITY, GRADE, MALE and YOS are statistically
significant in both equations. The signs of these
coefficients agree with expectations, with the exception (as
was the case with the logit) of ADVRATE. For the four
coefficients that are statistically significant, the signs are
the same for the first and second equations.
The coefficient of the independent variable MINORITY,
for the second equation, has the greatest magnitude of any of
the multinomial coefficients thus far. It indicates that, of
those eligible for VSI and SSB in fiscal 1993, minorities are
almost three times as likely to accept the program during a
"later" phase as they are during the first phase in which they
are eligible. This same effect applies to men and persons in
paygrade E-6. However, the magnitude of those coefficients is
less than half that of MINORITY.
The effects of the variables for fiscal 1992 and
fiscal 1993 seem to be different. First, only the independent
variables MINORITY and GRADE are statistically significant for
both equations in both year-groups. Also, in fiscal 1992,
there is no noticeable difference in magnitude between
equations. This implies that the individual variables are of
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little consequence as to the timing of the take decision for
persons eligible during fiscal 1992 only. This is somewhat in
conflict with the fiscal 1993 effects of MINORITY, GRADE and
MALE, as discussed above.
TABLE 18
MULTINOMIAL LOGIT RESULTS SHOWING RELATIVE PROBABILITY
OF TAKING IN FIRST OR LATER PHASE ELIGIBLE,
COMPARED TO NOT TAKING AT ALL,
ALL ELIGIBLES, FISCAL 1993 ONLY













SAMPLE SIZE 1 24,118
Source: Derived from data developed by the Defense Manpower
Data Center, 1993.
NOTES:
' P1 /P 3 is the relative probability of taking VSI or SSB
during the first eligible phase, compared to not taking the
bonus at all.
b P2/P 3 is the relative probability of taking VSI or SSB
during any other eligible phase, compared to not taking the
bonus at all.
*** p<=.01; ** p<=.05; * p<=.10
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4. FISCAL 1993 TAKE OPPORTUNITIES OF INDIVIDUALS ALSO
ELIGIBLE IN FISCAL 1992
The results obtained when the multinomial model was
run on the opportunities corresponding to personnel eligible
during both fiscal 1992 and fiscal 1993 are included in Table
19. The coefficients for MINORITY, NONGRAD, MARRIED, CHILD,
YOS, AFQT and UNRATE are statistically significant for both
equations. The signs of all of the coefficients agree with
those hypothesized. Of the coefficients that are
statistically significant for both equations, the signs
between the first and second equations are in agreement.
The coefficit it of the variable NONGRAD appears to
hold the greatest importance in this data set. Individuals
who have not graduated from high school are twice as likely to
accept the voluntary sepsratlin program during a later phase
relative to when first cligible. This appears to be the only
coefficient of consequence for this set of results.
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TABLE 19
MULTINOMIAL LOGIT RESULTS SHOWING RELATIVE PROBABILITY
OF TAKING IN FIRST OR LATER PHASE ELIGIBLE1
COMPARED TO NOT TAKING AT ALL,
















Source: Derived from data developed by the Defense Manpower
Data Center, 1993.
NOTES:
' PI/P 3 is the relative probability of taking VSI or .'"
during the first eligible phase, compared to not taking the
lionus at all.b P2 /P 3 is the relative probability of taking VSI or SSB
during any other eligible phase, compared to not taking the
bonus at all.
*0* p<=.01; ** p<=.05; * p<=.10
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMIENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This study attempts to gain some insight into the factors
that explain the timing and process of VSI and SSB acceptance
decisions. It is felt that this information will be useful in
determining the size of and criteria for future program
offerings.
The preliminary data analysis, consisting of "take"
percentages, mean characteristics, and the statistical
significance of the differences of means, provided some
meaningful information. The take rates for all eligible
sailors were 9.8 percent in fiscal 1992 and 11.7 percent in
fiscal 1993. The fiscal 1993 data were then divided into two
parts: individuals who were not eligible in fiscal 1993 and
those who were previously eligible. Individuals eligible for
the first time accepted VSI or SSB 13.9 percent of the time,
while those getting a "second chance" took advantage of the
program at a rate of 9.4 percent.
The vast majority of "takers" in every group analyzed
accepted VSI or SSB during the initial phase in which they
were eligible. For example, 72.7 percent of the fiscal 1992
takers made their decision during the initial phase of
eligibility. The initial phase take-rate for individuals
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first eligible during fiscal 1993 jumped to 97.7 percent,
while those previously eligible in fiscal 1992 accepted at a
rate of 83.5 percent.
These percentages suggest an increasing trend toward
accepting VSI or SSB the first time offered, as the overall
take-rate rose by over 4 percentage points for persons first
eligible for the program in fiscal 1993 over fiscal 1992.
This increase in the overall take rate could indicate an
increasing "comfort level" or familiarity with the program,
between the first and second years of the program. The large
increase in the initial phase take-rate from fiscal 1992 to
fiscal 1993 ( from 72.7 percent up to 97.7 percent) likewise
reflects an increased familiarity with the program specifics
on the part of eligible sailors, who may also have used the
time available between phases to review their options.
Another interesting finding of this preliminary analysis
concerns the take rate of those who do not make their program
decision in the first phase of eligibility. In fiscal 1992,
5.7 percent of the individuals eligible for more than one
phase took the separation bonus during a later phase. In
fiscal 1993, this number dropped to 0.6 percent for persons in
their first year of eligibility, and to 1.8 percent for those
who were also eligible during fiscal 1992. Obviously,
previously-eligible individuals already demonstrated a
tendency to not accept the separation bonus, and the much
lower "later" phase take-rate was to be anticipated. Reasons
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for the lower "later" take-rates of individuals eligible only
during fiscal 1993 are less clear. It is possible that this
strong bias away from "later" acceptance decisions is due to
information concerning the following year's preliminary
eligibility criteria. This pre-offering information could
allow these sailors to anticipate eligibility and make up
their mind prior to the actual offering.
The characteristics of persons accepting the program
during the initial phase of eligibility differ from those of
persons accepting during a later phase. Generally speaking,
though, individual characteristics that drive overall program
acceptance also control the timing of the acceptance
decisions. For example, minorities are much less likely to
accept the VSI and SSB programs, and when they do accept, they
are more likel,; to do so during a later phase.
The results from the bivariate analysis is a bit less
illuminating. The effects of the individual characteristics
agree with those obtained by the Mehay-Kirby study. The
coefficients of the individual PHSE variables confirm the
conclusions reached in the previous paragraphs: personnel are
more likely to accept VSI and SSB during their initial phase
of eligibility than in any later phase. At the same time, the
bivariate results indicate that individuals who are initially
eligible in a fiscal year (i.e., all eligibles in fiscal 1992
and persons eligible only in fiscal 1993) are also more likely
to take the program in the second phase rather than in a later
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phase. Individuals who were eligible during fiscal 1992 as
well as fiscal 1993, on the other hand, were less likely to
accept as the number of take opportunities increased, when
compared to the final two phases.
The multinomial logit analysis contributed very little to
understanding the timing of the acceptance decision. There is
no difference between the estimated coefficients for the two
responses, which suggests that the simple binomial logit
provides an adequate representation of the take decision-
making process.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on this study, the following recommendations are
offered:
"* The apparent tendency of "newly-eligible" personnel to
take at a higher rate than those eligible during a second
fiscal year must be kept in mind when establishing
eligibility criteria for future fiscal years.
"* The vast majority of individuals accepting this program in
the initial phase of eligibility may prove to be of
interest as the eligibility criteria are adjusted for
subsequent phases.
"* Further study should be conducted using the latest
available data. Updated information on both fiscal 1992
and fiscal 1993 became available too late to be of use in
this study and may prove to be of significance.
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APPENDIX A: V6I AND 883 PROGRAM ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
10JAN92 - ALNAV announcing FY92 participation in VSI/SSD
programs
Benefit programs were originally designed as indicated
below. The FY93 Defense Authorization Act equalized the non-
pecuniary benefit packages between all the separation
programs. The benefit packages were then made retroactive, so
that personnel who opted to voluntarily separate under VSI
received the same benefits as those who chose SSB, regardless
of the timing of the program acceptance. [Ref. 11:p. 93]
TRANSITION ASSISTANCE BENEFIT PACKAGES
M 20ssB
Pre-Separation Counseling X X X
Employment Assistance X X X
Relocation Assistance X X X
(Overseas)
Transition Health Care MX) X X
(CHAMPUS and In-house)
Up to 120 days after SEP
Two-Year Commissary and MX) X X
Exchange Privileges
Extended Use of DoDDS MX) X X
Schools (Overseas only
and if DEPNS have completed
11th grade at SEP)
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Ten Days Permissive TDY (X) X X
and Excess Leave for Relocation
Transition
Priority Reserve and (Z) X X
National Guard Affiliation
Within One Year of Separation
Extended Use of Military MI) MX) X
Housing (Up To 180 Days, with
rental charge)
Montgomery GI Bill (X) MI) X
Enrollment Opportunity
MK) Benefits added in FY93 Authorization Act. [Ref. 11:pp.
93-95]
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13 JAN 92 FIRST Phase fiscal 1992 announced





AK2 15 16 NEC 2824 NOT ELIGIBLE
AMS2 15 16
A02 13 16
AT2 15 16 NEC 6628, 6650, 6689 NOT ELIGIBLE
AWl 14 16 NEC 7821 ONLY
BMI 14 16 NEC 0161, 0167, 0215, 0216
NOT ELIGIBLE












DT1 15 16 NEC 0000, 8707 ONLY
DT2 14 16 NEC 0000, 8707 ONLY
EM(SW)I 15 16 NEC 4613-16, 4621, 4631-32, 4666,
4668-69, 4671-73, 4707 NOT ELIGIBLE
EM(SW)2 12 16 NEC 4613-16, 4621, 4631-32, 4666,






GMG1 15 16 NEC 0878, 0879 NOT ELIGIBLE
GMG2 11 16 NEC 0878, 0879 NOT ELIGIBLE
GMM1 15 16 NEC 0981 NOT ELIGIBLE
GMM2 10 16 NEC 0981 NOT ELIGIBLE
HM1 15 16 NEC 0000, 8404 ONLY
HM2 13 16 NEC 0000, 8404 ONLY
IC(SS)1 15 16
IC(SS)2 15 16
IMi 15 16 NEC 1801 NOT ELIGIBLE





















QM(SW)1 15 16 NEC 0161, 0167, 0215-16
NOT ELIGIBLE
QM(SW)2 13 16 NEC 0161, 0167, 0215-16
NOT ELIGIBLE
RM1 15 16 NEC 2313, 2318-19, 2346
NOT ELIGIBLE





SK1 14 16 NEC 2824 NOT ELIGIBLE
SM1 15 16
SM2 13 16






29 FEB 92 - SECOND Phase Fiscal 1992 announced





AK2 13 16 NEC 2824 NOT ELIGIBLE
AMS2 13 16
A02 12 16
AT2 11 16 NEC 6628, 6650, 6689 NOT ELIGIBLE
AT1 12 16 NEC 6628, 6650, 6689 NOT ZLIG3BLU
AWl 14 16 NEC 7821 ONLY
AZ2 14 16
BMI 12 16 NEC 0161, 0167, 0215, 0216
NOT ELIGIBLE












DT1 15 16 NEC 0000, 8707 ONLY
DT2 14 16 NEC 0000, 8707 ONLY
EM(SW)1 11 16 NEC 4613-36, 4621, 4631-32, 466G,
4668-69, 4671-73, 4707
NOT ELIGIBLE











GMG1 13 16 NEC 0878, 0879 NOT ELIGIBLE
GMG2 11 16 NEC 0878, 0879 NOT ELIGIBLE
GMMI 13 16 NEC 0981 NOT ELIGIBLE
GMM2 11 16 NEC 0981 NOT ELIGIBLE
HM1 15 16 NEC 0000, 8404 ONLY
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HM2 13 16 NEC 0000, 8404 ONLY
IC(SS)1 13 16
IC(SS)2 12 16
I1 12 16 NEC 1801, 1820-21 NOT ELIGIBLE
















O11 12 16 NEC 1801, 1820-21, 1918
NOT ELIGIBLE









QM1(SW) 15 16 NEC 0161, 0167, 0215-16
NOT ELIGIBLE








SKi 14 16 NEC 2824 NOT ELIGIBLE
SMi 13 16
SM2 11 16
STS1 12 16 NEC 0418, 0419 NOT ELIGIBLE






lighlighted entries are used to denote changes from the previous
phase.
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10 APR 92 - THIRD Phase Fiscal 1992 announced
* 10 APR - 20 MAY 92 *
RATING OONOTES
ABE1 10 17
AE1 14 17 NOTE 1.
AE2 10 17 NOTE 1.
AK1 13 17 NEC 2824 NOT ELIGIBLE
AK2 10 17 NEC 2824 NOT ELIGIBLE
ANSI 12 17 NOTE 1.
AMS2 10 17 NOTE 1.
AO1 12 17 NOTE 1.
A02 10 17 NOTE 1.
AT2 10 17 NOTE 1. NEC 6628, 6644, 6650, 6689 M
NOT ELIGIBLE
AT1 10 17 NOTE 1. NEC 6628, 6633, 6650, 6 6 8 9,
6695 NOT ELIGIBLE
AWl 12 17 NEC 7821 ONLY
AZ2 12 17
BMI 10 17 NEC 0161, 0167, 0215, 0216
NOT ELIGIBLE












DT1 14 17 NEC 8753 AND 8765 NOT ELIGIBLE
DT2 14 17 NEC 8753 AND 8765 NOT ELIGIBLE
EM1 11 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC
4626, 4632, 4671-73, 4707
NOT ELIGIBLE









FTB1 10 17 NEC 3307 NOT ELIGIBLE
FTB2 10 17 NEC 3307 NOT ELIGIBLE
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GMGI 10 17 NEC 0878, 0879 NOT ELIGIBLE
GMG2 10 17 NEC 0878, 0879 NOT ELIGIBLE
GmiM 10 17 NEC 0981 NOT ELIGIBLE
GMM2 10 17 NEC 0981 NOT ELIGIBLE
HM1 13 17 NEC 0000, 8404 ONLY
HM2 12 17 NEC 0000, 8404 ONLY
IC(SS)l 12 17
IC(SS)2 10 17
11 10 17 NEC 1801, 1820-21 NOT ELIGIBLE











MS2 10 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY
MS1 12 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY
MT1 10 17 NEC 3317, 3319 NOT ELIGIBLE
MT2 10 17 NEC 3317, 3319 NOT ELIGIBLE
NC1 12 17
OM 10 17 NEC 1801, 1820-21, 1918
NOT ELIGIBLE









QMI 12 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 0 1 6 1 ,
0167, 0215-16 NOT ELIGIBLE
QM2 10 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 0 1 6 1 ,
0167, 0215-16 NOT ELIGIBLE
RM1 10 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY.





SKI 12 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 2824 NOT
ELIGIBLE





STS1 10 17 NEC 0418, 0419 NOT ELIGIBLE





NOTE 1. INELIGIBLE AIRCREW NEC8: 8203, 8215, 8226l $235-38,
8251-52, 8262, 8284.
uighlighted entries are used to denote changes from the previous
phase.
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05 JUN 92 - FOURTH Phase Fiscal 1992 announced




AEI 12 17 NOTE 1.
AE2 10 17 NOTE 1.
AKi 13 17 NEC 2824 NOT ELIGIBLE
AK2 10 17 NEC 2824 NOT ELIGIBLE
ANSI 12 17 NOTE 1. NEC 7222, 830S, 8331 NOT
ELIGIBLE
AMS2 10 17 NOTE 1. NEC 7222, 3305, 8331 NOT
ELIGIBLE
AOl 12 17 NOTE 1.
A02 10 17 NOTE 1.
AT1 10 17 NOTE 1. NEC 6628, 6633, 6650, 6 5 9,
6689, 6695 NOT ELIGIBLE
AT2 10 17 NOTE 1. NEC 6628, 6633, 66S0, 6 S 9,
6689, 6695 NOT ELIGIBLE
AWl 10 17 NEC 7815, 7825-27, 7841, 7846, 7873,
7876 NOT ELIGIBLE




BM1 10 17 NEC 0161, 0167, 0215, 0216
NOT ELIGIBLE












DTl 14 17 NEC 8753 AND 8765 NOT ELIGIBLE
DT2 13 17 NEC 8753 AND 8765 NOT ELIGIBLE
EMi(BW) 10 17 NEC 4707 NOT ELIGIBLE
EM2(BW) 10 17 NEC 4707 NOT ELIGIBLE
ET1 10 17 NEC 14TG, 1420, 1428, 1450
NOT ELIGIBLE
ET2 10 17 NEC 14TG, 1420, 1428, 1450
NOT ELIGIBLE
W11 10 17 NEC 1734 NOT ELIGIBLE
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EW2 10 17 NEC 1734 NOT ELIGIBLE
FC1 10 17 NEC 1102-08p 1114-15, 1118-19, 1121,
1127,1143-44 NOT ELIGIBLE




GMG1 10 17 NEC 0878, 0879 NOT ELIGIBLE
GMG2 10 17 NEC 0878, 0879 NOT ELIGIBLE
GMM1 10 17 NEC 0981 NOT ELIGIBLE
GMM2 10 17 NEC 0981 NOT ELIGIBLE
HM1 13 17 NEC 0000, 8404 ONLY
HM2 12 17 NEC 0000, 8404 ONLY
ICi 10 17 NEC 4709, 4711-12, 4721, 4745, 4747
NOT ELIGIBLE
IC2 10 17 NEC 4709, 4711-12, 4721, 4745, 4747
NOT ELIGIBLE
IMi 10 17 NEC 1821 NOT ELIGIBLE









MS1 10 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY




OM1 10 17 NEC 1821, 1918 NOT ELIGIBLE







PRI 10 17 NEC 7352,7353 NOT ELIGIBLE
PR2 10 17 NEC 7352,7353 NOT ELIGIBLE
QM1 10 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC
0161, 0167, 0215-16 NOT ELIGIBLE
QM2 10 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC
0161, 0167, 0215-16 NOT ELIGIBLE
RM1 10 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY.
RM2 10 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY.
RPi 10 17
RP2 10 17
SHI 10 17 NEC 3111 NOT ELIGIBLE
92
SH2 10 17 NEC 3111 NOT ELIGIBLE
SKI 20 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 2824
NOT ELIGIBLE




8TG2 10 17 NEC 0401, 0407, 0410, 0414-17, 0428,
0430, 0439o 0455, 0480v
0490 NOT ELIGIBLE
STS1 10 17 NEC 0418, 0419, 0422 NOT ELIGIBLE
STS2 10 17 NEC 0418, 0419, 0422 NOT ELIGIBLE
WT1 10 17
WT2 10 17
YN1 10 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 2514
NOT ELIGIBLE
YN2 10 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 2514
NOT ELIGIBLE
NOTE 1. INELIGIBLE AIRCREW NECS: 8203, 8215, 8226, 8235-38,
8251-52, 8262, 8284.
Highlighted entries are used to denote changes from the previous
phase.
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29 SEP 92 FIRST Phase fiscal 1993 announced
* 1 OCT - 30 OCT 92 *
RATING NOTES
AT2 9 17 NEC 6619, 6628, 6633, 6650, 6652,
6653, 6658, 6659, 6688, 6689,
6694, 6695, 8262 NOT ELIGIBLE
EMI 9 17 NEC 4707 AND NUCLEAR QUALIFIED
NOT ELIGIBLE
EM2 9 17 NEC 4707 AND NUCLEAR QUALIFIED
NOT ELIGIBLE
ETI 8 17 NEC 14TG, 14TA, 1420, 1428, 1450,
3323, 3327 AND NUCLEAR QUALIFIED
NOT ELIGIBLE
ET2 12 16 NEC 14TG, 14TA, 1420, 1428, 1450,
3323, 3327 AND NUCLEAR QUALIFIED
NOT ELIGIBLE
FTG2 8 17 NEC 1174-82, 1301-11 NOT ELIGIBLE
IC1(SS) 8 17
IC2(SS) 8 17
MMI 8 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 4259,
4296 AND NUCLEAR QUALIFIED
NOT ELIGIBLE
MM2 8 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 4259,
4296 AND NUCLEAR QUALIFIED
NOT ELIGIBLE
RM1 8 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 8237
NOT ELIGIBLE
RM2 8 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 8237
NOT ELIGIBLE




09 NOV 92 - SECOND Phase fiscal 1993 announced




ATI 9 17 NEC 6619, 6628, 6633, 6650, 6652,
6658, 6659, 6663, 6688, 6689, 6694,
6695, 8262 NOT ELIGIBLE
AT2 9 17 NEC 6619, 6628, 6633, 6650, 6652, 00,
6658, 6659, 6663, 6688, 6689, 6694,
6695, 8262 NOT ELIGIBLE
ZT2 15 17 NEC 4503 NOT ELIGIBLE
CTM1 9 17 NEC 9238, 9247-49, 9280-95, 9287
NOT ELIGIBLE
CTM2 9 17 NEC 9238, 9247-49, 9260-65, 9287
NOT ELIGIBLE
EA1 12 17
EKC 14 17 NEC 4707 AND NUCLEAR QUALIIIED
NOT ELIGIBLE
EM1 9 17 NEC 4707, 4761 AND NUCLEAR QUALIFIED
NOT ELIGIBLE
EM2 9 17 NEC 4707, 4761 AND NUCLEAR QUALIFIED
NOT ELIGIBLE
EN1 12 17 NEC 4310, 4311, 4314, 4316, 4329,
4331, 4333, 4335, 4339, 4355,
4386, 4296 NOT ELIGIBLE
EN2 12 17 NEC 4310, 4311, 4314, 4316, 4329,
4331, 4333, 4335, 4339, 4355,
4366, 4296 NOT ELIGIBLE
ETC 14 17 NEC 1420, 1427, 1428, 1450, AND
NUCLEAR QUALIFIED NOT ELIGIBLE
ETI 8 17 NEC 1420, 1427, 1428, 1450, AND
NUCLEAR QUALIFIED NOT ELIGIBLE
ET2 12 16 NEC 1420, 1427, 1428, 1450, AND
NUCLEAR QUALIFIED NOT ELIGIBLE
ETC(SWB) 12 17 NEC 3323, 3327, 3328 NOT ELIGIBLE
ETI(SWS) 8 17 NEC 3323, 3327, 3328 NOT ELIGIBLE
ET2(SW8) 8 17 NEC 3323, 3327, 3328 NOT ELIGIBLE
tWC 14 17 NEC 1734 NOT ELIGIBLE
tWZ 9 17 NEC 1734 NOT ELIGIBLE
EW2 15 17 NEC 1734 NOT ELIGIBLE
IC1 9 17 NEC 1102-08, 1114, 1115, 1118,
1119, 1121, 1127, 1130, 1143,
1144, 1157 NOT ELIGIBLE
FTBC 12 17 NEC 3305 AND 3307 NOT ELIGIBLE
"1T]1 8 17 NEC 3305 AND 3307 NOT ELIGIBLE
FT32 8 17 NEC 3305 AND 3307 NOT ELIGIBLE
FTGC 14 17 NEC 1174-82, 1196, 1301-11, 1312,
1313, 1320 NOT ELIGIBLE
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7TG1 a 17 NEC 1174-82, 1196, 1301-11, 1312,
1313, 1320 NOT ELIGIBLE
FTG2 8 17 NEC 1174-82, 1196, 1301-11, 1312,





NOC a 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 4295,
4296 AND NUCLEAR QUALIFIED
NOT ELIGIBLE
MMI 8 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 4295,
4296 AND NUCLEAR QUALIFIED
NOT ELIGIBLE
MM2 8 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 4259,
4296 AND NUCLEAR QUALIFIED
NOT ELIGIBLE
MTC 12 17 NEC 3310, 3311, 3317, 3319
NOT ELIGIBLE
MT1 9 17 NEC 3310, 3311, 3317, 3319
NOT ELIGIBLE





RMC 14 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY.
RM1 8 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 8237
NOT ELIGIBLE
RM2 8 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 8237
NOT ELIGIBLE
STSC 12 17 NEC 0418, 0419, 0425 NOT ELIGIBLE
STS1 9 17 NEC 0418, 0419, 0423-25 NOT ELIGIBLE




Highlighted entries are used to denote changes from the previous
phase.
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29 DEC 92 - THIRD Phase Fiscal 1993 announced
* 29 DEC 92 - 31 JAN 93 *




ATC 14 17 NEC 6617, 6628, 6650,6653, 6689,
6695, NOT ELIGIBLE
ATI 9 17 NEC 6619, 6628, 6633, 6650, 6652,
6653, 6658, 6659, 6663, 6688, 6 6 8 9 ,
6694, 6695, 8262 NOT ELIGIBLE
AT2 9 17 NEC 6619, 6628, 6633, 6650, 6652,
6653, 6658, 6659, 6663, 6688, 6 6 8 9 ,
6694, 6695, 8262 NOT ELIGIBLE
BT2 15 17 NEC 4503 NOT ELIGIBLE
CTNC 14 17 NEC 9238, 9247-49, 9280-85, 9287
NOT ELIGIBLE
CTM1 9 17 NEC 9238, 9247-49, 9280-85, 9287
NOT ELIGIBLE
CTM2 8 17 NEC 9238, 9247-49, 9280-85, 9287
NOT ELIGIBLE
EAI 11 17 NEC 5931 AND 5932 NOT ELIGIBLE
301 13 17 NEC 5931 AND 5932 NOT ELIGIBLE
EMC 14 17 NEC 4707 AND NUCLEAR QUALIFIED
NOT ELIGIBLE
EMi 8 17 NEC 4707, 4761 AND NUCLEAR
QUALIFIED NOT ELIGIBLE
EM2 8 17 NEC 4707, 4761 AND NUCLEAR
QUALIFIED NOT ELIGIBLE
EN1 10 17 NEC 4310, 4311, 4314, 4316, 4329,
4331, 4333, 4335, 4339, 4355, 4 3 8 6,
4296 NOT ELIGIBLE
EN2 10 17 NEC 4310, 4311, 4314, 4316, 4329,
4331, 4333, 4335, 4339, 4355, 4 3 8 6 ,
4296 NOT ELIGIBLE
ETC 14 17 NEC 1420, 1427, 1428, 1450, AND
NUCLEAR QUALIFIED NOT ELIGIBLE
ET1 8 17 NEC 1420, 1427, 1428, 1450, AND
NUCLEAR QUALIFIED NOT ELIGIBLE
ET2 12 16 NEC 1420, 1427, 1428, 1450, AND
NUCLEAR QUALIFIED NOT ELIGIBLE
ETC(SWS) 12 17 NEC 3323, 3327, 3328 NOT ELIGIBLE
ETI(SWS) 8 17 NEC 3323, 3327, 3328 NOT ELIGIBLE
ET2(SWS) 8 17 NEC 3323, 3327, 3328 NOT ELIGIBLE
EWC 14 17 NEC 1734 NOT ELIGIBLE
EWI 9 17 NEC 1734 NOT ELIGIBLE
EW2 15 17 NEC 1734 NOT ELIGIBLE
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FC1 9 17 NEC 1102-08, 1114, 1115, 1118, 1119,
1121, 1127, 1130, 1143,
1144, 1157 NOT ELIGIBLE
FTBC 12 17 NEC 3305 AND 3307 NOT ELIGIBLE
FTBI 8 17 NEC 3305 AND 3307 NOT ELIGIBLE
FTB2 8 17 NEC 3305 AND 3307 NOT ELIGIBLE
FTGC 14 17 NEC 1174-89, 1196, 1301-11, 1312,
1313, 1320 NOT ELIGIBLE
FTG1 8 17 NEC 1174-82, 1196, 1301-11, 1312,
1313, 1320 NOT ELIGIBLE
FTG2 8 17 NEC 1174-82, 1196, 1301-11, 1312,





MMC 8 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 4295,
4296 AND NUCLEAR QUALIFIED
NOT ELIGIBLE
MMI 8 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 4295,
4296 AND NUCLEAR QUALIFIED
NOT ELIGIBLE
MM2 8 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 4259,
4296 AND NUCLEAR QUALIFIED
NOT ELIGIBLE
MR2 12 17
MTC 12 17 NEC 3310, 3311, 3317, 3319
NOT ELIGIBLE
MT1 8 17 NEC 3310, 3311, 3317, 3319
NOT ELIGIBLE






QXM (sB) 10 17
RMC 14 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY.
RMI 8 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 2319,
8237 NOT ELIGIBLE
RM2 8 17 SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 2319,
8237 NOT ELIGIBLE
STSC 12 17 NEC 0418, 0419, 0425 NOT ELIGIBLE
STS1 9 17 NEC 0418, 0419, 0423-25 NOT ELIGIBLE





NOTE 1. INELIGIBLE AIRCRiW NECS: 8203t 6215, 8226, 0235-38,
8251-52, 8262# 8234.
Highlighted entries are used to denote changes from the previous
phase.
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APPENDIX D: SELECTED SAO PROGRAM CODING
"***CODING FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
IF RACE NE 1 THEN MINORITY-i;
ELSE MINORITY-0;
IF PG-6 THEN GRADE-i;
ELSE GRADE=0;
*DELETING INVALID AFQT SCORES;
IF AFQT>10;
*CODING FOR EDUCATIONAL CERTIFICATION;
IF EDCERT < 15 THEN NONGRAD=1; ELSE NONGRAD=O;
IF EDCERT=15 THEN HSGRAD=i; ZLSE HSGRAD=O;
IF MS=2 THEN MARRIED=l;
ELSE MARRIED=O;
IF DEPS=i OR DEPS=O THEN CHILD=0;
ELSE CHILD=(DEPS-1);
IF SEX-i THEN MALE=i;
ELSE MALE=0;
IF SMS-0 THEN MILSPS=O;
ELSE MILSPS=i;
PRATE=SUBSTR (PMOS,1,3);
IF PRATE IN ('AE' 'AT' 'DS' 'ET' 'EW' 'FTB' 'MT' 'STG' 'STS')
THEN HITECH-i;
ELSE HITECH-0;
"***CHANGE HOR VARIABLE TO UNRATE2 VARIABLE;
IF TXi-1 THEN DO;
IF HOR -01 THEN UNRATE2 = 7.5;
IF HOR -02 THEN UNRATE2 = 7.8;
IF HOR -03 THEN UNRATE2 = 4.2;
IF HOR -04 THEN UNRATE2 = 7.0;
IF HOR -05 THEN UNRATE2 - 6.6;
IF HOR -06 THEN UNRATE2 - 9.5;
IF HOR -08 THEN UNRATE2 = 5.5;
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NOR -09 THEN UNRATE2 - 7.1;
HOR -10 THEN UNRATE2 - 5.4;
HOR -11 THEN UNRATE2 - 8.3;
HOR -12 THEN UNRATE2 - 9.4;
HOR -13 THEN UNRATE2 - 7.3;
HOR -14 THEN UNRATE2 - 2.8;
HOR -15 THEN UNRATE2 - 4.2;
NOR -16 THEN UNRATE2 - 5.7;
HOR -17 THEN UNRATE2 - 6.5;HOR -18 THEN UNRATE2 
- 5.9;
HOR -19 THEN UNRATE2 - 3.6;
HOR -20 THEN UNRATE2 - 4.1;
HOR -21 THEN UNRATE2 - 6.9;
HOR -22 THEN UNRATE2 - 8.0;
HOR -23 THEN UNRATE2 - 5.6;
HOR -24 THEN UNRATE2 - 6.6;
HOR -25 THEN UNRATE2 - 8.0;
HOR -26 THEN UNRATE2 - 8.5;
HOR -27 THEN UNRATE2 - 4.5;
HOR -28 THEN UNRATE2 - 9.2;
HOR -29 THEN UNRATE2 - 6.2;
HOR -30 THEN UNRATE2 - 6.0;
HOR -31 THEN UNRATE2 - 3.3;
HOR -32 THEN UNRATE2 - 6.8;
HOR -33 THEN UNRATE2 - 6.9;
HOR -34 THEN UNRATE2 - 9.1;
HOR -35 THEN UNRATE2 = 6.8;
HOR -36 THEN UNRATE2 - 8.2;
HOR -37 THEN UNRATE2 = 5.8;
HOR -38 THEN UNRATE2 = 4.6;
HOR -39 THEN UNRATE2 - 6.9;
HOR -40 THEN UNRATE2 = 6.2;
HOR -41 THEN UNRATE2 = 6.7;
HOR -42 THEN UNRATE2 - 7.5;
HOR -43 THEN UNRATE2 = 14.9;
HOR -44 THEN UNRATE2 - 9.2;
HOR -45 THEN UNRATE2 - 6.1;
HOR -46 THEN UNRATE2 = 2.8;
HOR -47 THEN UNRATE2 = 6.2;
HOR -48 THEN UNRATE2 - 6.7;
NOR -49 THEN UNRATE2 - 5.3;
HOR -50 THEN UNRATE2 = 5.7;
HOR -51 THEN UNRATE2 - 6.1;
HOR -53 THEN UNRATE2 = 6.3;
HOR -54 THEN UNRATE2 = 11.0;
HOR -55 THEN UNRATE2 = 4.7;
HOR -56 THEN UNRATE2 - 4.4;
HOR -168 THEN UNRATE2 - 8.1;
HOR -0 OR HOR-. OR HOR-3 OR HOR=7 OR HOR=52 OR HOR-135
HOR-137 OR HOR-166 OR FOR-168 OR HOR=186 OR HOR=222 THEN DELETE;
D;
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******FY 92 ANNUAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATES*******;
IF TX2-1 THEN DO;
IF HOR-01 THEN UNRATE3-7.3;
IF HOR-02 THEN UNRATE3-9.1;
IF HOR-03 THEN UNRATE3-4.5;
IF HOR-04 THEN UNRATE3-7.4;
IF HOR-05 THEN UNRATE3-7.2;
IF HOR-06 THEN UNRATE3-9.1;
IF HOR-08 THEN UNRATE3-5.9;
IF HOR-09 THEN UNRATE3-7.5;
IF HOR-10 THEN UNRATE3-5.3;
IF HOR-l1 THEN UNRATE3-8.4;
IF HOR-12 THEN UNRATE3-8.2;
IF HOR-13 THEN UNRATE3-6.9;
IF HOR-14 THEN UNRATE3-2.8;
IF HOR-15 THEN UNRATE3-4.5;
IF HOR-16 THEN UNRATE3=6.5;
IF HOR-17 THEN UNRATE3-7.5;
IF HOR-18 THEN UNRATE3=6.5;
IF HOR-19 THEN UNRATE3=4.6;
IF HOR-20 THEN UNRATE3=4.2;
IF HOR-21 THEN UNRATE3-6.9;
IF HOR-22 THEN UNRATE3-8.1;
IF HOR-23 THEN UNRATE3-7.1;
IF HOR-24 THEN UNRATE3-6.6;
IF HOR-25 THEN UNRATE3=8.5;
IF HOR=26 THEN UNRATE3-8.8;
IF HOR-27 THEN UNRATE3-5.1;
IF HOR-28 THEN UNRATE3-8.1;
IF HOR-29 THEN UNRATE3-5.7;
IF HOR-30 THEN UNRATE3-6.7;
IF HOR-31 THEN UNRATE3-3.0;
IF HOR-32 THEN UNRATE3=6.6;
IF HOR-33 THEN UNRATE3=7.5;
IF HOR-34 THEN UNRATE3-8o4;
IF HOR-35 THEN UNRATE3-6.8;
IF HOR-36 THEN UNRATE3-8.5;
IF HOR-37 THEN UNRATE3-5.9;
IF HOR-38 THEN UNRATE3-4.9;
IF HOR-39 THEN UNRATE3-7.2;
IF HOR-40 THEN UNRATE3-5.7;
IF HOR441 THEN UNRATE3-7.5;
IF HOR-42 THEN UNRATE3-7.5;
IF HOR-43 THEN UNRATE3-14.9;
IF HOR-44 THEN UNRATE3-8.9;
IF HOR-45 THEN UNRATE3-6.2;
IF HOR-46 THEN UNRATE3-3.1;
IF HOR-47 THEN UNRATE3-6.4;
IF HOR-48 THEN UNRATE3-7.5;
IF HOR-49 THEN UNRATE3-4.9;
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IF HOR-50 THEN UNRATE3-6.6;
IF HOR-51 THEN UNRATE3-6.4;
IF HOR-53 THEN UNRATE3-7.5;
IF HOR-54 THEN UNRATE3-11.3;
IF HOR-55 THEN UNRATE3-5.1;
IF HOR-56 THEN UNRATE3-5.6;
IF HOR-168 THEN tTNRATE3-8.1;
IF HOR -0 OR HOR-. OR HOR-3 OR HOR-7 OR HOR-52 OR HOR-135
OR HOR-137 OR HOR-166 OR HOR-168 OR HOR-186 OR HOR-222 THEN DELETE;
END;
S***** CREATE ADVANCEMENT OPPORT VAR BY RATING ******;
• ** PERS 22 MARCH 1992 ADVANCEMENT FIGURES ****;
**********FOR E-5 TO E-6*********;
IF TXI-l THEN DO;
IF PRATE ": 'AD' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 1.99;
IF PRATE I: 'AE' AND PG=5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 1.99;
IF PRATE -: 'AK' AND PG=5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 2.51;
IF PRATE -:'AMS' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 4.77;
IF PRATE -:'AO' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.08;
IF PRATE -:'AT' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.08;
IF PRATE -:'AW' AND PG=5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 3.02;
IF PRATE -:'AZ' AND PG=5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.36;
IF PRATE -:'BM' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.36;
IF PRATE -:'DC' AND PG=5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 77.14;
IF PRATE -:'DK' AND PG=5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 4.77;
IF PRATE -:'DM' AND PG=5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 7.46;
IF PRATE -: DP' AND PG=5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 10.98;
IF PRATE -:'DS' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 10.98;
IF PRATE -:'DT' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 = 12.69;
IF PRATE -:IEM' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 2.17;
IF PRATE -:'ET' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 2.17;
IF PRATE -:IEW' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 2.17;
IF PRATE -:'FC' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 20.35;
IF PRATE -:'FTB' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 14.41;
IF PRATE -:'GMG' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 14.41;
IF PRATE -:'GMM' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 40.99;
IF PRATE -:'HM' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 9.31;
IF PRATE -:'IC' AND PG=5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 2.07;
IF PRATE -:'IM' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 4.17;
IF PRATE -:IJO' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 38.60;
IF PRATE -:ILI' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 38.60;
TF PRATE -w:'M' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 28.16;
IF PRATE -:'MN' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 4.55;
IF PRATE -:'JMS' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.80;
IF PRATE -:'JMT' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.80;
IF PRATE =:'OM' AND PG=5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 3.574;
IF PRATE -:'PC' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 4.76;
IF PRATE -:'PH' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 4.76;
IF PRATE -:'PN' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 7.27;
IF PRATE -:'PR' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 7.27;
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IF PRATE -:'QM' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 8.30;
IF PRATE -:'RM' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 = 1.98;
IF PRATE -:IRP' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 1.98;
IF PRATE I:ISH' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 15.34;
IF PRATE -:'SK' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.83;
IF PRATE -:ISM' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.08;
IF PRATE -:"STG' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.08;
IF PRATE -:'STS' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.08;
IF PRATE -:'WT' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 2.00;
IF PRATE -:'YN' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.15;
*****E-6 ADVRATE FIGURES ARE FY92 FROM BUPERS/MEHAY****;
IF PRATE I: 'ABE' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 1.99;
IF PRATE -: IAEl AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 1.99;
IF PRATE I: 'AK' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 2.51;
IF PRATE -:'AMS' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 4.77;
IF PRATE -:'AO' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.08;
IF PRATE -:'AT' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.08;
IF PRATE -:'AW' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 3.02;
IF PRATE -:'AZ' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.36;
IF PRATE -:IBM' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.36;
IF PRATE -:'DC' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 77.14;
IF PRATE -:'DK' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 4.77;
IF PRATE -:'DM' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 7.46;
IF PRATE -:'DP' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 10.98;
IF PRATE -:IDS' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 10.98;
IF PRATE -:'DT' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 12.69;
IF PRATE -:'EM' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 = 2.17;
IF PRATE -:'ET' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 = 2.17;
IF PRATE -:'EW' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 = 2.17;
IF PRATE -:'FC' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 = 20.35;
IF PRATE -:'FTB' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 = 14.41;
IF PRATE -:'GMG' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 = 14.41;
IF PRATE -:'GMM' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 = 40.99;
IF PRATE -:'HM' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 9.31;
IF PRATE -:IIC' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 2.07;
IF PRATE -:'IM' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 = 4.17;
IF PRATE -:'JO' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 38.60;
IF PRATE -:'LI' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 38.60;
IF PRATE -:'MM' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 28.16;
IF PRATE =:'MN' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 4.55;
IF PRATE -: MS' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.80;
IF PRATE =:'MT' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.80;
IF PRATE -:'OM' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 3.574;
IF PRATE =:'PC' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 = 4.76;
IF PRATE -:'PH' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 4.76;
IF PRATE -:'PN' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 7.27;
IF PRATE -:'PR' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 = 7.27;
IF PRATE =:'QM' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 8.30;
IF PRATE =:'RM' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 = 1.98;
IF PRATE -:'RP' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 = 1.98;
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IF PRATE -:'SH' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 15.34;
IF PRATE -:'SK' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.83;
IF PRATE -:'SM' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.08;
IF PRATE -:'STG' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.08;
IF PRATE -:'STS' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.08;
IF PRATE -:'WT' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 2.00;
IF PRATE -:"YN' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 5.15;
IF PRATE ": 'ABE' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 I 8.46;
ir PRATE ": 'AEI AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 10.00;
IF PRATE -: 'AK' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 21.05;
IF PRATE -:'ANSI AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 25.80;
IF PRATE ",:'AOO AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 13.21;
IF PRATE -:'AT' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 18.34;
IF PRATE -:'AW' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 6.00;
IF PRATE -:'AZ' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 " 17.10;
IF PRATE -:'BM' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 42.11;
IF PRATE -:'DC' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 15.98;
IF PRATE -:'DK' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 7.60;
IF PRATE -:'DMI' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 = 11.76;
IF PRATE -:'DP' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 13.72;
TF PRATE -:'DS' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 15.10;
IF PRATE -:IDT' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 27.78;
IF PRATE -: 'EM' AND PG"6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 13.42;
IF PRATE -:*ET' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 53.06;
IF PRATE -:'EW' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 22.22;
IF PRATE -:'FC' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 15.74;
IF PRATE -: 'FTB' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 20.00;
IF PRATE -: 'GNG' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 16.29;
IF PRATE -:'GMM' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 16.29;
IF PRATE ":'HM' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 25.05;
IF PRATE -:'IC' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 = 24.48;
IF PRATE -:'IN' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 10.00;
IF PRATE -:'JO' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 17.50;
IF PRATE -:'LI' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 25.71;
IF PRATE -: IMN' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 39.20;
IF PRATE -:O'MN' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 64.71;
IF PRATE -:'MS' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 = 31.20;
IF PRATE -:IMT' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 13.73;
IF PRATE m:'NC' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 100.00;
IF PRATE -:'ON' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 11.43;
IF PRATE -:'PC' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 19.67;
IF PRATE ":'PH' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 8.14;
IF PRATE -:'PN' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 15.75;
IF PRATE -:'PR' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 18.68;
IF PRATE -:'QM' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 59.13;
IF PRATE : 'RN' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 37.51;
IF PRATE =:'RP' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 14.55;
IF PRATE -:'SH' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 29.37;
IF PRATE -:'SK' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 18.10;
IF PRATE -:'SM' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 Is 10.17;
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IF PRATE -:'STS' AND P0-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 17.79;
IF PRATE -:'WTI AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 Is 7.55;
IF PRATE -:.YN' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE2 - 19.55;
END;
******FY93 ADVANCEMENT FIGURES ARE FROM SEP92 CYCLE****;
******FROM JUNE 92 E-7 BOARD, AND FROM E-8 BOARD***;
IF TX2-1 THEN DO,
IF PRATE-:'AT' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE3-7o01;
IF PRATE-:IEN' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE3-8.03;
IF PRATE-:'EMI AND PG-S THEN ADVRATE3-2.05;
IF PRATE-:'FTG' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE3-18.82;
IF PRATE-:'IC' AND PG-S THEN ADVRATE3-2.16;
IF PRATE-:'ICO AND P0-6 THEN ADVRATE3-13.31;
IF PRATE-:'MM' AND PG-S THEN ADVRATE3-9.91;
IF PRATE-:'MM' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE3-2.OS;
IF PRATE-: 'RN' AND PG-S THEN ADVRATE3-2.11;
IF PRATE-. 'IRN' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE3-1.93;
IF PRATE-:'STSI AND PG=S THEN ADVRATE3-3.92;
IF PRATE-:'WT' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE3-1.89;
IF PRATE-:'WT' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE3-1.72;
IF PRATE-:IAEI AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE3-6.81;
IF PRATE-:IAE' AND PG-S THEN ADVRATE3-2.03;
IF PRATE-: 'AT' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE3=11.28;
IF PRATE-:'BT' AND P0-5 THEN ADVRATE3-1.97;
IF PRATE-:'CTM' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE3-14.08;
IF PRATE-:IEA' AND P0-6 THEN ADVRATE3-7.14;
IF PRATE-:'EM' AND PG-7 THEN ADVRATE3-4.96;
IF PRATE-:'EN' AND P0=5 THEN ADVRATE3-2.17;
IF PRATE-:IEN' AND P0-6 THEN ADVRATE3-13.74;
IF PRATE-:'ET' AND P0-7 THEN ADVRATE3=5.OO;
IF PRATE-:'ET' AND P0-6 THEN ADVRATE3-2.O8;
IF PRATE-:'ET' AND PG-S THEN ADVRATE3-9.93;
IF PRATE-:'EW' AND P0-7 THEN ADVRATE3-8.46;
IF PRATE-:IEW' AND P0=6 THEN ADVRATE3-10o04;
IF PRATE-:'EWI AND PG-S THEN ADVRATE3-2.OO;
IF ';RATE-:IFC' AND P0=6 THEN ADVRATE3-2.OO;
IF P)XA1E-:'FTB' AND P0-7 THEN ADVRATE3-7.77;
IF PRATE-:'FTB' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE3-3.41;
IF PRATE-:'FTB' AND PG-S THEN ADVRATE3-2.23;
IF PRATE-:'FTG' AND P0-7 THEN ADVRATE3-7.77;
IF PRATE-:'FTG' AND P0-6 THEN ADVRATE3-2l.28;
IF PRATE-:'FTG' AND P0-5 THEN ADVRATE3-18.82;
IF PRATE-:IICI AND P0-7 THEN ADVRATE3-5.63;
IF PRATE-:'IC' AND P0-6 THEN ADVRATE3-13.31;
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IF PR&TE-:'IC' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE3-2.16;
IF PRATE-:'IM' AND PG-7 THEN ADVRATE3-1O.34;
IF PRATE-:'3OE' AND PG-7 THEN ADVRATE3-6.94;
IF PRATE-:'MT' AND PG-7 THEN ADV1RATE3-2.37;
IF PRATE-: 'NT' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE3-1O.37;
IF PRATE-:'NT' AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE3-2.05;
IF PRATE-:'OM' AND PG=7 THEN ADVRATE3-3.57;
IF PRATE-:'OTA' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE3-13.04;
IF PRATE-:'OTAI AND PG=5 THEN ADVRATE3-18.35;
IF PRATE-:IBM' AND PG-7 THEN ADVRATE3-4.98;
IF PRKTE-:'STS' AND PG-7 THEN ADVRATE3-7.1O;
IF PRATE-:'STSI AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE3-2.33;
IF PRATE-:'WTI AND PG-7 THEN ADVRATE3-2.67;
IF PRATE-:'WT' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE3-1.72;
IF PRATE-:'WTI AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE3-1.89;
IF PRATE-:'AE' AND PG=7 THEN ADVRATE3-7.59;
IF PRATE-:'AT' AND PG-7 THEN ADVRATE3-4.74;
IF PRATE-:'CTM' AND PG=7 THEN ADVRATE3=9.09;
IF PRATE-:'CTH' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE3-14.OS;
IF PRATE-:'CTMI AND PG-5 THEN ADVRATE3-2.30;
IF PRATE-:'EO' AND PG=6 THEN ADVRATE3-O.74;
IF PRATEw:'FC' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE3-2.OO;
IF PRATE-:'RN' AND PG-7 THEN ADVRATE3-3.29;
IF PRATE-:'QM' AND PG-6 THEN ADVRATE3=2.43;
IF PRATE-:'QN' AND PG-7 THEN ADVRATE3=2.24;
IF PRATE-: 'MR' AND PG=5 THEN ADVRATE3-5.80;
END;
*****END OF VARIABLE CODING*****;
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***CODING USED TO "CLEAN UP" DATA***
IF 0A92 NE 0 THEN DO;
IF OPHASE5-. THEN OPHASE5-0;
IF OPHASE6-. THEN OPHASE6-o;
IF OPHASE7-. THEN OPHASE7o0;
IF APHASE93-. THEN APHASE93-0;
END;
IF 0A93 NE 0 THEN DO;
IF OPHASEl-. THEN OPHASE1-0;
IF OPHASE2-. THEN OPHASE2-0;
IF OPHASE3-. THEN OPHASE3-0;
IF OPHASE4-. THEN OPHASE4-0;
IF APHASE92-. THEN APHASE92-0;
END;









IF APHASE92-8 OR APHASE92-0 THEN NOTAKE92-1;
ELSE TAKE92-1;
IF APHASE93-9 OR APHASE93=0 THEN NOTAKE93=1;
ELSE TAKE93-1;















IF PG<5 THEN DELETE;
IF YOS<6 THEN DELETE;
IF YOS>18 THEN DELETE;
IF OA-0 THEN DELETE;
IF OA-6 THEN DELETE;
IF OA"445679 THEN DELETE;
IF OA-3035679 THEN DELETE;
IF OA-3030679 THEN DELETE;
IF OA-3440079 THEN DELETE;
IF OA-3445679 THEN DELETE;
IF OA-20020679 THEN DELETE;
IF OA-20025679 THEN DELETE;
IF OA-23035679 THEN DELETE;
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***CODING USED FOR MEANS AND T-TESTS FOR STATISTICAL SIGNIFZCANCB***
IF OAin77 OR OA-606 OR OA-5005 OR OA-440000 OR OA-3030000 OR OA-20020000
OR OA-100010000 THEN DO;
ALL 1ST-i; END; ELSE DO; ALLiST-0;
END;
IF OA-100010000 OR OA-20020000 OR OA=3030000 OR OA-440000 THEN DO;
FIRST_92-1; END; ELSE DO; FIRST_92-0;
END;
IF OA-5005 OR OA-606 OR OA-77 THEN DO;
FIRST_93-1; END; ELSE DO; FIRST_93-0;
END;
IF ALL IST-0 THEN DO;
IF (APHASE92-1 OR APHASE92-2 OR APHASE92-3 OR APHASE92-4





IF FIRST 92-0 THEN DO;





IF FIRST 93-0 THEN DO;





IF (TXi-i AND TX2-1) THEN DO;





IF FST 9293-0 THEN DO;








VAR MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE UNRATE;





VAR MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE UNRATE;





VAR MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE UNRATE;




PROC MEANS DATA=OTHER9 2;
VAR MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE UNRATE;





VAR MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE UNRATE;




PROC MEANS DATA-OTHER9 3;
VAR MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE UNRATE;
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VAR MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE UNRATE;





VAR MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE UNRATE;
TITLE 'MEANS OF OTHER TAKERS-ELIG BOTH 92 & 93';
DATA SIG TEST;
SET ONE;
IF ALL_1ST-1 THEN SIGALL=i;
ELSE IF ALLOTH-i THEN SIGALL=2;
ELSE SIG ALL=.;
IF FIRST_92-1 THEN SIG_92=1;
ELSE IF OTHER_92=1 THEN SIG_92=2;
ELSE SIG_92-.;
IF FIRST 93-1 THEN SIG 93=1;
ELSE IF OTHER_93-1 THEN SIG_93=2;
ELSE SIG_93-.;
IF FST 9293-1 THEN SIG 9293-1;




VAR MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE UNRATE;
TITLE 'SIGNIFICANCE TESTING FOR ALL TAKERS';
PROC TTEST DATA-SIG TEST;
CLASS SIG 92;
VAR MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE UNRATE;
TITLE 'SIGNIFICANCE TESTING FOR FISCAL 92 TAKERS';
PROC TTEST DATASIG TEST;
CLASS SIG 93;
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VAR MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE UNRATE;
:TLE 'SIGNIFICANCE TESTING FOR FISCAL 93 TAKERS';
bC TTEST DATA-SIG TEST;
CLASS SIG_9293;
VAR MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE UNRATE;
:TLE 'SIGNIFICANCE TESTING FOR ELIG FISCAL 92 & 93 TAKERS';
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***PROGRAMIONG DEVELOPED TO "STACK" VARIABLES
DATA PHASEl;
SET ONE;
IF OA GE 100010000;
PH-i;
PHSEi-i; PHSE2-0; PHSE3-0; PHSE4-0; PHSE5-0; PHSE6-0; PHSE7-0;
IF APHASE92-1 THEN TAKE-0; ELSE TAKE-i;
DATA PHASE2;
SET ONE;
IF OA GE 20020000;
IF APHASE92-1 THEN DELETE;
PH-2;
IF OA GE 100010000 THEN DO;
PHSEI-0; PHSE2-1; PHSE3=0; PHSE4-0; PHSE5=0; PHSE6=0; PHSE7-0;
END;
IF OA GE 20020000 AND OA LT 100010000 THEN DO;
PHSEI-I; PHSE2-0; PHSE3-0; PHSE4-0; PHSE5=0; PHSE6=0; PHSE7-0;
END;
IF APHASE92-2 THEN TAKE-0; ELSE TAKE=l;
DATA PHASE3;
SET ONE;
IF OA GE 3030000;
IF APHASE92-1 OR APHASE92-2 THEN DELETE;
PH-3;
IF OA GE 100010000 THEN DO;
PHSEI-0; PHSE2=0; PHSE3-1; PHSE4-0; PHSE5=0; PHSE6=0; PHSE7-0;
END;
IF OA GE 20020000 AND OA LT 100010000 THEN DO;
PHSEi-0; PHSE2-i; PHSE3-0; PHSE4=0; PHSE5-0; PHSE6=0; PHSE7-0;
END;
IF OA GE 3030000 AND OA LT 20020000 THEN DO;
PHSEI-i; PHSE2-0; PHSE3-0; PHSE4-0; PHSE5-0; PHSE6-0; PHSE7-0;
END;





'APHASE92-1 OR APHASE92-2 OR APHASE92-3 THEN DELETE;
[-4;
OA GE 100010000 THEN DO;
PHSE1-O; PHSE2-0; PHSE3-0; PHSE4-1; PHSE5-0; PHSE6-0; PHSE7-O;
!D;
OA GE 20020000 AND OA LT 100010000 THEN DO;
PHSE1-0; PHSE2-0; PHSE3-1; PHSE4-0; PHSE5-0; PHSE6=0; PHSE7-0;
rD;
OA ( J030000 AND OA LT 20020000 THEN DO;
PHSE1-0; PHSE2-1; PHSE3-0; PHSE4=0; PHSES-0; PHSE6=0; PHSE7-O;
rD;
OA GE 440000 AND OA LT 3030000 THEN DO;
ISEI-1; PHSE2-0; PHSE3-0; PHSE4=0; PHSE5-0; PHSE6-0; PHSE7-0;
ID;




I OA-123480000 OR OA=23480000 OR OA-3480000 OR OA=480000
THEN DELETE;
APHASE92-1 OR APHASE92=2 OR APHASE92-3 OR APHASE92=4 THEN DELETE;
-5;
OA GE 100010000 THEN DO;
PHSE-0; PHSE2=0; PHSE3=0; PHSE4=0; PHSE5-1; PHSE6=0; PHSE7-O;
D;
OA GE 20020000 AND OA LT 100010000 THEN DO;
PHSE1-O; PHSE2-0; PHSE3=O; PHSE4-1; PHSE5-0; PHSE6=0; PHSE7-0;
D;
OA GE 3030000 AND OA LT 20020000 THEN DO;
PHSElmO; PHSE2-0; PHSE3-1; PHSE4-0; PHSE5-0; PHSE6-0; PHSE7-0;
D;
OA GE 440000 AND OA LT 3030000 THEN DO;
PHSE1-0; PHSE2-1; PHSE3-0; PHSE4=0; PHSE5=0; PHSE6-0; PHSE7-0;
D;
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IF OA GE 5005 AND OA LT 440000 THEN DO;
PHSE1-1; PHSE2-0; PHSE3-0; PHSE4-0; PHSE5-0; PHSE6-0; PHSE7-0;
END;
IF APHASE93-5 THEN TAKE-0; ELSE TAKE-i;
DATA PHASE6;
SET ONE;
IF OA GE 606;
IF OA-5009 OR OA-480079 OR OA-480609 OR OA=485009 OR OA-3480079
OR OA-3480609 OR OA-23480079
OR OA-123480000 OR OA-23480000 OR OA-3480000 OR OA-480000
OR OA-23480609 OR OA-123480609 OR OA=123480079 THEN DELETE;
IF APHASE92-1 OR APHASE92-2 OR APHASE92-3 OR APHASE92-4
OR APHASE93-5 THEN DELETE;
PH-6;
IF OA GE 100010000 THEN DO;
PHSE1-0; PHSE2=0; PHSE3=0; PHSE4=0; PHSE5=0; PHSE6=1; PHSE7-0;
END;
IF OA GE 20020000 AND OA LT 100010000 THEN DO;
PHSE1-0; PHSE2=0; PHSE3-0; PHSE4=0; PHSE5=1; PHSE6=0; PHSE7=0;
END;
IF OA GE 3030000 AND OA LT 20020000 THEN DO;
PHSEl-0; PHSE2=0; PHSE3=0; PHSE4=1; PHSE5=0; PHSE6=0; PHSE7-0;
END;
IF OA GE 440000 AND OA LT 3030000 THEN DO;
PHSE1-0; PHSE2=0; PHSE3=1; PHSE4=0; PHSE5=0; PHSE6=0; PHSE7=0;
END;
IF OA GE 5005 AND OA LT 440000 THEN DO;
PHSE1-0; PHSE2=1; PHSE3=0; PHSE4=0; PHSE5=0; PHSE6=0; PHSE7=0;
END;
IF OA GE 606 AND OA LT 5005 THEN DO;
PHSE1-1; PHSE2=0; PHSE3-0; PHSE4=0; PHSE5=0; PHSE6=0; PHSE7=0;
END;
IF APHASE93-6 THEN TAKE=0; ELSE TAKE-i;
DATA PHASE7;
SET ONE;
IF OA GE 77;
IF OA-609 OR OA=5009 OR OA-5609 OR OA=480079 OR OA=480609
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OR OA-480679 OR OA-485009 OR OA-485609 OR OA-3480079
OR OA-3480609 OR OA-3480679 OR OA-3485609 OR OA-23480079
OR OA-123480000 OR OA-23480000 OR OA-3480000 OR OA=480000
OR OA-23480609 OR OA=23480679 OR OA-23485609 OR
OA-123480679 OR OA-123480609 OR OA-123480079 THEN DELETE;
IF APHASE92-1 OR APHASE92-2 OR APHASE92-3 OR APHASE92-4
OR APHASE93-5 OR APHASE93-6 THEN DELETE;
PH-7;
IF OA GE 100010000 THEN DO;
PHSE1-0; PHSE2-0; PHSE3-0; PHSE4-0; PHSE5-0; PHSE6-0; PHSE7-1;
END;
IF OA GE 20020000 AND OA LT 100010000 THEN DO;
PHSEI-O; PHSE2-0; PHSE3=0; PHSE4=0; PHSE5-0; PHSE6-1; PHSE7-0;
END;
IF OA GE 3030000 AND OA LT 20020000 THEN DO;
PHSE1-0; PHSE2=0; PHSE3=0; PHSE4=0; PHSE5=1; PHSE6=0; PHSE7-0;
END;
IF OA GE 440000 AND OA LT 3030000 THEN DO;
PHSEI-0; PHSE2-0; PHSE3=0; PHSE4=1; PHSE5-0; PHSE6=0; PHSE7-0;
END;
IF OA GE 5005 AND OA LT 440000 THEN DO;
PHSE1-0; PHSE2-0; PHSE3=1; PHSE4=0; PHSE5=0; PHSE6-0; PHSE7-0;
END;
IF OA GE 606 AND OA LT 5005 THEN DO;
PHSE1=0; PHSE2=1; PHSE3=0; PHSE4=0; PHSE5=0; PHSE6=0; PHSE7=0;
END;
IF OA GE 77 AND OA LT 606 THEN DO;
PHSE1-1; PHSE2=0; PHSE3=0; PHSE4=0; PHSE5=0; PHSE6=0; PHSE7=0;
END;
IF APHASE93=7 THEN TAKE=0; ELSE TAKE=l;
DATA ALL7;
SET PHASE1 PHASE2 PHASE3 PHASE4 PHASE5 PHASE6 PHASE?;
IF PHSE6-1 OR PHSE7=1 THEN PHSE67=1; ELSE PHSE67-0;
IF TAKE-0 THEN TAKER=1; ELSE TAKER=0;
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VAR MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE UNRATE;
PROC LOGISTIC DATA=ALL7 MAXITER-50;
MODEL TAKE - MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE UNRATE PHSE1 PHSE2 PHSE3
PHSE4 PHSE5;
PROC REG DATA=ALL7;
MODEL TAKER - MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE UNRATE PHSE1 PHSE2 PHSE3
PHSE4 PHSE5;
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***PRoGRKMING FOR NOTIOHAL PERSON RESULTS
DATA TWO;
INPUT MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE UNRATE
PHSE1 PHSE2 PHSE3 PHSE4 PHSE5;
KEEPME-1;
CARDS;
0 1 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 3.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 2.16 0 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 2.16 1 13.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 1 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 70.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 1 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 11.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 8.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 3.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 2.16 0 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 2.16 1 13.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 1 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 70.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 1 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 11.13 7.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 8.34 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 2.16 1 12.62 0 60.98 0 10.13 7.34 0 0 0 1 0





MODEL TAKE - MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE UNRATE






VAR YHAT MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE UNRATE
PHSE1 PHSE2 PHSE3 PHSE4 PHSE5;
TITLE 'PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOR ALL ELIGIBLES';
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***PRO3MUjXNG FOR MULTINOXIAL LOGIT MODELS
DATA ALL7;
SET PHASE1 PHASE2 PHASE3 PHASE4 PHASE5 PHASE6 PHASE7;
IF TAKEm0 THEN TAKER-i; ELSE TAKER-0;
IF OA-77 OR OA-606 OR OA-5005 OR OA-440000 OR OA-3030000 OR OA-20020000
OR OA-100010000 THEN DO;
ALL IST-1; END; ELSE DO; ALLiST-0;
END;
IF ALL IST-0 THEN DO;
IF (APHASE92-1 OR APHASE92-2 OR APHASE92-3 OR APHASE92=4





IF ALL IST-i THEN MULTI-i;
ELSE IF ALL OTH-i THEN MULTI-2;




VAR TAKE MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE2 UNRATE2 PHSE1 PHSE2 PHSE3
PHSE4 PHSE5 PHSE6 PHSE7 PHSE67;
PROC CATMOD DATA-ALL7;
RESPONSE LOGITS;
DIRECT MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE UNRATE;
MODEL MULTI - MINORITY GRADE NONGRAD HSGRAD MARRIED CHILD
MALE YOS MILSPS AFQT HITECH ADVRATE UNRATE/
COVB ML NOPROFILE NOGLS;
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